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Abstract 
Previous scholarly studies of the relationship between the media and the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda focus on the international newspaper coverage of the 
genocide, the use of print and radio hate propaganda by genocide perpetrators, 
and the international community’s refusal to jam Radio Télévision Libre des Mille 
Collines’s (RTLM) hate radio broadcasts. Working at the intersection of genocide 
studies and media studies, this thesis contributes to the existing scholarly 
discourse by analyzing the daily content of the genocide on ABC, CBS, and NBC 
television news broadcasts between April 6, 1994 and July 18, 1994. I conclude 
that the American networks often used stereotypes that erroneously suggested 
the genocide was African ‘tribal warfare’; misunderstood and misreported key 
information; focused on sensational entertainment stories; and contributed to a 
failed international response. My findings contribute to a growing discourse of 
genocide prevention and enable scholars, journalists, and the public to learn from 
the failed television news coverage.   
 
 
 
Keywords 
Rwanda, 1994, Genocide, News Media, ABC World News, NBC Nightly News, 
CBS Evening News, Tutsi, Hutu. 
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Introduction 
 
"The news media—both domestic and international—played a 
crucial role in the 1994 Rwanda genocide." 
--Romeo Dallaire1  
 
On April 6, 1994, the world was introduced genocide in Rwanda. In the 
aftermath of the genocide, scholars from many disciplinary backgrounds have 
asked how the international community—especially the Belgians, the French, the 
Americans, and the member nations of the UN Security Council—were able to sit 
back and observe the murder of close to one million people in one hundred days 
without intervening to stop the killing. My thesis explores an important, but under-
represented, element of the failed international response:  the coverage of the 
Rwandan genocide by the US television news networks. Existing scholarship 
about the media and the Rwandan genocide has focused on the perpetrators’ 
use of hate propaganda in print and on Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM) radio broadcasts2, the international community’s refusal to jam RTLM’s 
radio signals3, and international newspaper coverage of genocide.4,5 My thesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Romeo Dallaire, “The Media Dichotomy,” in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, ed. Allan 
Thompson. (London: Pluto Press, 2007),12. 
2 Alison Des Forges,“Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994,” in The Media and the Rwanda 
Genocide, ed. Allan Thompson. (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 41.  
3 Mary Kimani, “RTLM: the Medium that Became a Tool for Mass Murder,” in The Media and the 
Rwanda Genocide, ed. Allan Thompson. (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 110. 
4 Amanda Grzyb, “Media Coverage, Activism and Creating Public Will for Intervention in Rwanda 
and Darfur,” in The World and Darfur: International Response to Crimes Against Humanity in 
Western Sudan, ed. Amanda Grzyb. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 61.  
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contributes to this scholarly discourse by analyzing daily coverage on ABC, CBS, 
and NBC television news broadcasts. Working at the intersection of media 
studies and comparative genocide studies, I suggest that the television news 
employed racist stereotypes, described the genocide as another instance of 
African ‘tribal warfare,’ misreported key information, and turned their focus to 
other more sensational stories.  
While several scholars, such as Allan Thompson and Amanda Grzyb, 
have written about the newspaper coverage of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, my 
research focuses on the impact of television news reports during the same 
period. I divide my analysis into two time periods: April 6 to April 30 and May 1 to 
July 18. The first period represents both a critical window for international 
intervention, and the international media’s establishment of a common public 
discourse about the nature of the Rwandan massacres. During the second 
period, the media focus shifted from confused reports of massacres to coverage 
of the growing refugee crisis.  
The ABC, CBS and NBC television news footage was purchased and 
loaned from Vanderbilt University’s Television News Archive. The footage used 
in the analysis referenced Rwanda in some capacity between April 6, 1994 and 
July 18, 1994. I conducted a content analysis after viewing the news footage 
chronologically and I noted all of discourse used by the journalists, broadcasters, 
and interviewees. I also noted all of the images and the text that the broadcaster 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Alan Kuperman, “How the Media Missed the Rwanda Genocide,” in The Media and the Rwanda 
Genocide, ed. Allan Thompson. (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 256.  
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used on the screen. More specifically, my analysis of the television news 
coverage was guided by the following research questions:  
1. What language do the journalists and anchors use to describe the 
genocide?  
2. Who are the sources for the Rwanda stories? Witnesses and 
survivors? Expatriates trying to flee Rwanda? NGO, UN, or United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda officials?  Representatives of 
the Clinton administration?  Scholars or Experts?   
3. How are images and audio material used to describe what is 
happening to the people of Rwanda in 1994?  Is the material sourced 
from news services, or do the networks have journalists on the ground 
in Rwanda? Are networks using the same stock footage of violence? 
How are they contextualizing these images of violence?  How graphic 
is the coverage; does it include images of massacres or corpses?  Are 
the images primarily of women and children (which might suggest 
genocide and crimes against humanity) or primarily of men (which 
might suggest “civil war”)? 
4. Where is the story placed within the broadcast and what is its 
duration? What does this placement reveal about network priorities?  
5. How frequently are the broadcasters presenting stories about 
Rwanda?  
6. How accurate is the information that the networks were presenting?  
When do they first use the word “genocide”?  
7. What are the other stories that were making the headlines between 
April 6th, 1994 and July 18th, 1994? When Rwanda is not the lead 
story, what are some reasons why other stories were favoured over 
the genocide?   
 
In Chapter One, I outline a brief chronological history of Rwanda, including 
the colonial era, the transition to independence, postcolonial Hutu–Tutsi conflict, 
the 1994 genocide, and the international media’s treatment of the genocide. I 
provide context for understanding the colonial origins of the genocide, and 
explain why the massacre of one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu was not ‘tribal 
warfare’.  
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In Chapter Two, I analyze ABC, CBS, and NBC television news coverage 
of the genocide between April 6, 1994 and April 30, 1994. The coverage during 
the first month of the genocide reveals the dominant news frames, errors and 
misinformation perpetuated by the networks, and reflects the complacency of the 
UN and the international community.  As Linda Melvern suggests, it was the 
initial reporting during the month of April that essentially laid the groundwork for 
the misreporting that followed in the summer of 1994. This phenomenon was 
especially apparent when the news media suggested that the genocide “was the 
result of ancient tribal hatreds,” which was, in Melvern’s words, “quite simply 
wrong.”6  
In what immediately took hold as the dominant stereotype, the American 
television networks unanimously described the Rwandan genocide as chaotic 
tribal warfare. Amanda Grzyb suggests that the racialized discourse of “‘tribal 
warfare’ paints Africans (in general) and Rwandans, Hutu and Tutsi (in particular) 
with perilously broad strokes.”7 I also suggest that the assumption that news 
media can reprioritize government intervention in Africa after 1993 is often 
misguided, primarily because of the “misunderstanding of the causes of 
intervention in Somalia.”8  Ultimately, this chapter will explore television news 
discourse filled with “African” stereotypes, the connections between the coverage 
of Somalia and Rwanda, the reasons why Rwanda was not a ‘good story’ for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (London: Zed 
Books, 2000), 198.  
7 Grzyb, “Media Coverage, Activism and Creating Public Will for Intervention in Rwanda and 
Darfur,” 65.  
8 Steven Livingston, “Limited Vision: How Both the American Media and Government Failed 
Rwanda,“ in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, ed. Allan Thompson. (London: Pluto Press, 
2007),189.  
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media industry, and the ways in which the story of the genocide  “simply did not 
break through” with any accuracy until it was practically over.9   
 In Chapter Three, I analyze the American television coverage between 
May 1, 1994 and July 18, 1994. After the first month of coverage, the media 
networks significantly decreased the number of stories about the genocide.  
Coverage did not pick up again until the end of July, when the networks produced 
a rush of stories of the growing Hutu refugee crisis in Goma, Zaire.10 The ABC, 
CBS and NBC coverage in May and June presented many of the same racist 
stereotypes and inaccurate claims about “tribal warfare” that they used to 
describe the genocide in Rwanda the month prior.  As Grzyb suggests, “western 
media coverage of Africa remains entrenched in the language and ideologies of 
colonialism, which used stereotypes to justify the widespread abuse, exploitation 
and enslavement of African peoples.”11 My third chapter also demonstrates how, 
in Romeo Dallaire’s words, Rwanda was still of “little strategic value” for the 
international community, including the news media.12  Finally, I also demonstrate 
how other stories – including the O.J. Simpson case, the South African elections, 
the Tonya Harding arrest, and the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia 
– overshadowed the television coverage of the genocide.13  
Ultimately, my research provides a significant look at the American 
television news networks’ poor coverage of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Thompson, Allan. “Introduction,” in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, ed. Allan Thompson. 
(London: Pluto Press, 2007), 5.  
10 Thompson, “Introduction,” 7.  
11 Grzyb, “Media Coverage, Activism and Creating Public Will for Intervention in Rwanda and 
Darfur,” 68.  
12 Dallaire, “The Media Dichotomy,” 14.  
13 Dallaire, “The Media Dichotomy,” 14.  
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Overall, this analysis will add new resources to the current research on the 
international media and coverage of the 1994 genocide, which will hopefully 
guide future newsmakers during their coverage of other crises. By conducting 
research at the intersection of media studies and genocide studies, it is my 
objective to help shape future responses, modify journalistic practices, and 
suggest that the news media can play an important role in genocide intervention 
and prevention.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Background: How Rwanda’s Colonial History precipitated 
Genocide and How the International Media Ignored it. 
 
In Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Alison Des Forges 
writes that in order for one to “understand how some Rwandans could carry out a 
genocide and how the rest of the world could turn away from it, we must begin 
with history.”14 Misunderstanding the history and the context of the events in 
Rwanda between April 6 and July 18, 1994, was a fundamental flaw in the 
American television coverage.  Understanding the events that occurred in the 
decades prior to the genocide helps to construct an informed understanding of 
both the origin and nature of the Tutsi massacres in 1994. As I outline in the 
following chapters, ABC, CBS and NBC appeared oblivious to Rwanda’s past 
and did not provide nearly enough context for their viewers. 
 
Pre-1994 History 
Linda Melvern suggests that the history of pre-colonial Rwanda is “largely 
a mystery”15 to Americans, partially because Rwandans documented their history 
using oral myths and poems for hundreds of years. The pre-colonial Rwandan 
myths described the Rwandan kings, the Mwami, who “ruled the Earth’s most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Alison Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda,” Human Rights 
Watch & FIDH, March 1, 1999, accessed September 10, 2010, 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/rwanda0399.htm. 
15 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 7.  
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powerful kingdom”16 and owned everything: the land, cattle and people. The 
original inhabitants of the region were the Twa (often all “Pygmies”), and the 
descendents of the people that are now known as the Hutu and Tutsi settled in 
and around the region over a period of roughly two thousand years.17 While 
building the kingdom of Rwanda, the people developed a single and highly 
sophisticated language, which was known as Kinyarwanda, and established a 
culture built around the value of “song, dance, poetry and rhetoric.”18  
 During Rwanda’s development, the vast majority of the population 
identified as cultivators and occasionally raised small livestock or cattle, but all of 
the governmental institutions in Rwanda were “shaped by both pastoralists and 
cultivators.”19 As Des Forges explains, “cultivators and pastoralists lived 
interspersed in most areas,” and when the first European explorers arrived in 
Rwanda, they used one’s occupation as an identifier for whether they were Hutu, 
Tutsi or Twa.20 However, Linda Melvern21 and Mahmoud Mamdani22 both 
suggest that there is no consensus between historians and anthropologists about 
the origins of Hutu or Tutsi identities. Some anthropologists suggest that the Hutu 
and Tutsi are not in any way distinct groups, and their distinction is “more one of 
class or caste.”23 Nor do scientists find any DNA differences between Hutu and 
Tutsi. Mamdani insists that the two scholarly traditions of the “distinct difference” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 7. 
17 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 7. 
18 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda.” 
19 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda.” 
20 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda.” 
21 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 8. 
22 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 42. 
23 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 8. 
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and the “no difference” arguments have influenced the development of 
scholarship about Rwanda’s history. In fact, since the debate surrounding the 
origins of the Tutsi and Hutu has been “from the outset framed in political terms 
by the colonial state,”24 it has been a task for historical scholars to find the truth 
beneath the colonial discourse. The differences between Hutu and Tutsi 
developed as the Rwandan state grew and groups became more identifiable 
through their occupations. Des Forges writes that the word “Tutsi” was used to 
describe an individual who was “a person rich in cattle,” and, over time, became 
the signifier that referred to the “elite group.”25 Alternatively, the word “Hutu” 
identified the “subordinate or follower of the more powerful person,” and the 
“mass of the ordinary people,” but these terms really did not spread completely 
across the country until after the first Europeans arrived.26 
Until 1890, the kingdoms of Ruanda-Urundi were isolated from the outside 
world and other nations. The first German and English explorers who set foot in 
Rwanda found themselves in the company of a population that was linguistically 
and culturally homogeneous, but had divided itself into three different groups: the 
Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa.27 The realization that there were three different 
“groups” in the population was the foundation for the Western colonial discourse, 
in which the groups are "often and inappropriately…called the ’tribes’ of 
Rwanda."28  Melvern concurs that “these groups were not tribes, for the people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 
42.  
25 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda.” 
26 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda.” 
27 Prunier, Gerald, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995), 5. 
28 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 5. 
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shared the same religion, told the same ancestral stories, and spoke the same 
language,”29 and they were still able to do this despite the fact that “inequality 
was inscribed in the different treatment accorded to each group, and within each 
group.”30 The suggestion that the Hutu, Twa and Tutsi were “distinct ethnic 
groups” started with an English explorer, John Henning Speke, who also named 
Lake Victoria in 1859.31  
It is also important for scholars not to dispose of one myth and implement 
another one in its place—such as the suggestion that, in a pre-colonial society, 
the Hutu and Tutsi lived in “an eternally blissful harmony.”32  Without a doubt, the 
potential for conflict based on power or land certainly “existed long before the 
advent of European rule,” but scholars, such as Rene Lemarchand, look to the 
German and Belgian colonial rule as the “crucible within which ethnic identities 
were reshaped and mythologized.”33 Other genocide scholars, such as Mamdani, 
also agree that “political identities are the consequence of how power is 
organized,” so the colonial organization of Rwanda into the ‘tribes’ “not only 
defines the parameters of the political community, telling us who is included and 
who was left out, it also differentiates the bound political community internally.”34 
Driven by theories of eugenics, the “organization of power” created by early 
colonial settlers determined who was “left out.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, 7. 
30 Rene Lemarchand, “The 1994 Rwanda Genocide,” in Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and 
Eyewitness Accounts, ed. Samuel Totten et al. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 396.  
31 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, 8. 
32 Lemarchand, “The 1994 Rwanda Genocide,” 396. 
33 Lemarchand, “The 1994 Rwanda Genocide,” 397. 
34 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 
22. 
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Since the beginning of German and Belgian colonial rule in Rwanda, ideas 
of ‘ethnicity’ have plagued the country. German and Belgian colonial settlers 
were influenced by the pseudoscience of eugenics and a desire for indirect rule 
of the Hutu majority via Tutsi leadership. German presence in Rwanda officially 
began on May 4, 1894—exactly one hundred years before the 1994 genocide—
when the German count, Gustav Adolf von Gotzen, traveled to Rwanda as 
Governor of German East Africa.35  At the time of Von Gotzen’s visit, King 
Rwabugiri of Rwanda was unaware that almost ten years earlier—after the 1885 
Berlin Conference—European superpowers divided the African continent up into 
pieces—despite knowing nothing about the territory.36 Ruanda-Urundi was 
claimed as part of German East Africa.  
Many of the initial European colonizers suggested that Rwanda was “the 
Pearl of Africa”37 or referred to it as the “Land of a Thousand Hills” because of 
the lush, hilly terrain. Since Rwanda is found within a unique geographical 
location surrounded by hills and jungle, appropriate land distribution and 
coordination with the ever-increasing population were difficult tasks. In addition to 
concerns about land distribution, the terrain also forced the new inhabitants to 
heavily rely on agriculture because they discovered that Rwanda was a 
landlocked country with very few exploitable natural resources.38 If Rwanda had 
exploitable natural resources, the outcome of colonial settlement or the genocide 
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might have been drastically different, a point that some of the American television 
broadcasters acknowledged at the end of July.39   
When German rule evaporated during WWI, the territory of “East Africa,” 
which included Rwanda, was given to Belgium, which, Melvern observes, 
“intended to help those of the world’s peoples who were considered incapable of 
ruling themselves.”40 Many of the same racial theories and views of economic 
exploitation implemented by Germany were continued after the Belgians took 
control of Ruanda-Urundi in 1916.  Both Germany and Belgium “sought to rule 
Rwanda with the least cost and the most profit.”41 Understanding the organization 
of power within a colonial state like Rwanda is a complex matter, especially when 
there is no consensus on the origins of the Tutsi and the Hutu. Either way, the 
Hutu and Tutsis became racialized objects created through colonial rule that was 
influenced by eugenics and the science of race, which exacerbated existing 
power differences. In order to “compose” colonial states, Mamdani suggests that 
there are two different forms of political identity that are responsible: "direct and 
indirect rule.”42 Direct rule is created through "race-based political identities: 
settler and native," and indirect rule fractures the "race consciousness of 
natives," which is accomplished by separating the community "into multiple and 
separate ethnic consciousness."43  
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 The West has historically attempted to portray colonialism as a "civilizing 
project" for the benefit of the indigenous people.44 This notion is known 
historically as the "white man's burden,” and one of the primary objectives of the 
colonies carving out land was to introduce a Western style system of law and 
governance that legalized discrimination based on racial difference. Mamdani 
suggests that the manifestation of colonial constructed racial difference is based 
on the idea that "Tutsi aristocrats looked different from Hutu commoners."45   
Theories of eugenics—the organization of people based on race and physical 
characteristics—played a crucial role in Belgium’s ability to alter the Rwandan 
state for the purpose of “administrative efficiency.”46 This included the systematic 
removal of Hutu from positions of power throughout the country, as well as 
excluding them from access to higher education, which inevitably rendered it 
impossible for Hutu to get careers with any political or economic clout.47 As Des 
Forges suggests, the push towards Tutsi monopoly did not occur solely during 
the 1920s and 1930s, because it also took place during the next generation. 
Many scholars view this “divide and rule” strategy as an example of “the racist 
convictions common to most early twentieth century Europeans.”48  
 Belgian colonial rule broke down most of Rwanda’s organized state 
apparatus when, through indirect rule, they introduced money, forced labour to 
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build roads, and a Western education system.49 In the 1930s – despite pledging 
to ensure “freedom of speech and religion for its colonies” – the Belgians 
introduced racial ‘identity cards’ that divided the Rwandan population into three 
distinct “races”50 and solidified ideas of racialized differences between Tutsi and 
Hutu. Every adult Rwandan was obligated to register with the government and 
identify whether they were Hutu, Tutsi or Twa at the time of their birth.51 This 
process soon became part of a national census in 1933, which was used to 
classify the entire population of Rwanda. Melvern writes: 
Every Rwandan was counted and measured: the height, the 
length of their noses, the shape their eyes. Everyone was 
classified: the Tutsi were taller, the Hutu were shorter and 
broader, although for many Rwandans it was not possible to 
determine ethnicity on the basis of physical appearance.52  
Des Forges suggests that physical characteristics separated some of the Tutsi 
from the Hutu, but a genealogical recording was considered more accurate.53 
The racially-obsessed European explorers analyzed the physical characteristics 
of these three apparent ‘tribes’ and designated their new social hierarchy based 
on appearance. If the Belgians were going to limit access to employment and 
higher administrative posts and education to the Tutsi, they had to figure out who 
exactly was Tutsi and who was Hutu.   
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The Belgian rule over the Rwandans continued until the late 1950s, when 
the Hutu began to rebel against the subservient colonial status. In 1957, Hutu 
leaders published the “Hutu Manifesto,” which called for the end of the Tutsi 
dominance over the majority, and suggested that the main problem in Rwanda 
was “Tutsi supremacy.”54 Many of the Hutu believed in the premise that the Tutsi 
were “not really Rwandans at all”—fuelled by the history of eugenics-inspired 
divisions—so their postcolonial image of Rwanda meant both an end to Belgian 
colonization and freedom from Tutsi rule.55  Shortly after the publication of the 
Hutu manifesto in 1957 by the Hutu Emancipation Movement, which later 
became the Parmehutu political party, the UN anticipated a “rapprochement 
between the races,” and the Belgians were called in to help calm down the 
growing tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi.56 In reality, the Belgians did not 
help put out the flames in what was essentially a “Belgian-assisted coup,”57 and 
the 1957 manifesto maintained that the biggest problem in Rwanda was Tutsi 
supremacy.  In 1959, the manifesto gained traction, especially after the death of 
the Rwandan King, so the Tutsis—who subsequently repelled the emerging Hutu 
leadership—blamed his death on the Belgians and the Hutu extremists.58  In 
November of 1959, ethnic violence “erupted” in Rwanda, and thousands of Tutsi 
died on the one side of the ethnic “fault line.”59 In 1959, after Belgian authorities 
began to comply with the majority Hutu and removed Tutsi from the powerful 
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positions in the country, thousands of Tutsi were killed in conflicts and thousands 
of others fled to neighboring countries like Uganda. The 1959 massacres of the 
Tutsi was described by the UN General Assembly as “Nazism against the Tutsi 
minority,”60 and became one of the first of “several alleged genocides”61 against 
the Tutsi minority.  
 The relationship between the Hutu and Belgians grew more difficult, 
especially after the UN called on the Belgians to “emancipate the down trodden 
Hutu.”62 On July 1, 1961,63 following the 1960 and 1961 presidential elections 
that were both won by the Parmehutu political party—the party that exclusively 
identified with the Hutu—eighty percent of the Rwandan parliament voted to end 
the connection to their country’s monarchy and separated their ties to Belgium. 
Together, these events are known as the “Hutu Revolution,”64 and Rwanda 
independence was born in July 1962.  Immediately following the revolution, in 
1963, Rwanda faced new massacres that some scholars characterize as a 
precursor to the events of 1994. Melvern explains, “the element of planned 
annihilation links the killings in 1963 to the genocide of 1994. The planning and 
the methods used, thirty years apart, are similar.” 65    
After 1963, Des Forges suggests that the same identity cards that once 
“served to guarantee privilege to Tutsi” became, instead, a means to discriminate 
against them.66  She writes: 	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Hutu used the ideas once prized by the Tutsi—ideas about Tutsi 
distinctiveness, foreign origins, and complete control over the 
Hutu—to justify the violence of the revolution and the 
discriminatory measures of the years after.67 
 In 1952, 17.5% of the population in Rwanda was Tutsi, but by 1991, the Tutsi 
represented only 8.4% of the population; a result of massacres, forced exile, and 
instances where Tutsi illicitly redefined themselves as Hutu.  
  In 1973, following a military coup, General Juvenal Habyarimana became 
the president of Rwanda promising to “restore order and national unity.”68 
Habyarimana’s single party control under the National Revolutionary Movement 
for Development constructed what Des Forges calls a “cohesive monolith.”69  
However, there were still Rwandan Tutsis who were forced to live in exile 
throughout the 1970s; some estimates put the Tutsi refugee figures at close to 2 
million people.70  In 1979, the first organized counter group was established in a 
refugee community in Uganda—the Rwandan Refugees Welfare Association 
(RRWA), which soon evolved into the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity 
(RANU)—and they started the push for a right of return to Rwanda. 71 In 1987, 
while following a mandate dedicated to the return of the refugees to Rwanda, the 
independent group, RANU, changed its name one more time to three letters that 
became well-known over the following 10 years: the RPF - The Rwandan 
Patriotic Front. 	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The formation of the RPF and the 1990 RPF invasion was described as "a 
crisis of postcolonial citizenship" because of the years of being viewed and 
repressed as something invented by the previous colonizers.72 The Hutu 
revolution “planted the seeds of the refugee-warrior militancy,”73 and the RPF 
representatives suggested that it was important to invade the country because 
they felt that “the repression [against the Tutsi] in Rwanda could only get 
worse.”74 On October 1, 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda and attempted to take 
immediate possession of the weapons supplies in the country.75 Along with the 
invasion, the RPF requested democratization, social services, the elimination of 
corruption and an “end to Rwanda’s ethnic divide and the system of compulsory 
identity cards.”76 Melvern suggests that the invasion ended in a “disaster” 
because “nothing went to plan” on the second day when one of the RPF leaders, 
Fred Rwigyema, was killed.77 After the invasion, the RPF was pushed back to a 
heavily forested volcanic mountain range in the Northwest area of Rwanda where 
the group essentially fell apart. However, shortly after the failed invasion from the 
outside, Paul Kagame returned to Rwanda to lead the RPF after partaking in 
military training at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas.78 Kagame later became an important part of the RPF 
during the 1994 genocide, and, in 2000, he became the sixth president of 
Rwanda. 	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 After the 1990 RPF invasion, there was an obvious panic by the Hutu and 
those in political positions throughout Kigali, and the Rwandan government 
focused its efforts on buying weapons. Egypt was one of the key resources for 
obtaining weapons,79 and the arms deal remained relatively secret, primarily 
because international powers attempted to prevent the 1990 civil war between 
the RPF and the Rwandan government forces.80 The forceful and strong-handed 
movements by Rwanda’s president, Habyarimana, reinforced the image of a 
“repressive regime”—which even moved some of the dissatisfied Hutu over to the 
RPF.81 In fact, by the time any serious talks began to happen with the RPF in 
regards to a cease-fire, the Rwandan army had grown to 30,000 soldiers.82 Over 
the three years of sporadic fighting between the RPF and the Rwandan 
government, the RPF was not able to broaden its political base, and the civil war 
inevitably divided society towards more extreme political and economic 
instability.83  The civil war had a “devastating effect on Rwanda”—especially 
considering the fact that it was displacing thousands of refugees every day to 
neighbouring countries.84  
The French government also highlighted another early warning about the 
growing crisis in Rwanda, and they focused on the inner circle of power 
surrounding Agathe Habyarimana—the president’s wife.  The French feared that 
a very distinct racist ideology—suggesting that the Hutu were a superior race—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, 31 
80 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, 32 
81 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda.” 
82 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda.” 
83 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, 39 
84 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, 39 
	   	    
	  14	  
had not just erupted “as a consequence of the RPF invasion,” but they had a 
feeling that this ideology “had been nurtured for decades.” 85 Just like the 
genocide, a root cause of the civil war was fueled by the fact that individuals had 
been identified, “mythologized and manipulated for political advantage.”86 The 
situation in Rwanda in the early ‘90s was “no secret” and human rights groups 
used the word “genocide” to describe “massacres of Tutsi in the northern 
prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri.”87 However, despite the warnings of 
growing tension and genocide, the international community remained apathetic. 
In fact, the massacres prior to 1994 were essentially done using some of “the 
same methods used in the 1994 genocide”—using machetes and other common 
‘tools’—in a kind of “dress rehearsal.”88   
In 1993, the Hutu and the RPF negotiated a series of peace and power-
sharing agreements known as the Arusha Accords,89 which were developed in 
Arusha, Tanzania.90 At the same time as they talked about peace, the Rwandan 
government was importing thousands of machetes and other agricultural tools in 
18 separate deals with companies primarily from China.91 In 1993 alone, Rwanda 
imported 581,175 kg of machetes at a cost of $725,669, which did not include the 
“agricultural tools” like axes, screwdrivers, saws, knives, pliers, scissors, 
hammers, etc. These “tools”—which were later used as weapons—were 
purchased at $4.6 million from a company called Oriental Machinery Incorporated 	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in Beijing, which was owned by Felicien Kabuga—a main financer of the anti-
Tutsi propaganda radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM).92 AK-47s also became a popular import and helped move Rwanda—one 
of the poorest countries in the world in 1993—to becoming the third-largest 
importer of weapons in Africa.93 However, while all of the weapons were being 
imported, Rwanda’s economy was under control by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, so why didn’t the international community notice the 
suspicious pattern?94 Stephen Goose and Frank Smyth suggest that the 
international community often ignores the transfer of light conventional weapons 
that are responsible for the majority of the killings of civilians and combatants 
because they are “concentrating instead on the dangers of nuclear arms 
proliferation.”95 In fact, what is more disturbing, is the realization that more than a 
dozen nations, including countries that were part of the former Warsaw Pact, 
“helped fuel the Rwandan war,” because of the fact that “both sides appear to 
have purchased considerable weaponry through private sources on the open 
market.”96 If the international community decided to control the flow of light 
weapons and other arms into Rwanda, some scholars, such as Goose and 
Smyth, suggest that the outcome of the genocide “would have been different.”97  
 In late 1993 and early 1994, many of the international agencies in 
Rwanda grew concerned about the possibility of a large number of casualties if 
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the Arusha Accords did not successfully maintain the peace.98  Despite 
attempting to publicly express his concerns about what was developing in 
Rwanda, Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire – commander of a UN Chapter 699 
observation mission in Rwanda in October 1993 – did not have support from the 
UN Security Council.100 Based on intelligence from a Hutu informant, Gen. 
Dallaire planned an arms seizure in Kigali in early January. On January 11, 1994, 
Dallaire sent the UN Security Council what later became known as the “genocide 
fax,”101 a heavy worded letter detailing that Rwanda was heading for a conflict of 
massive proportions.102 In response, the UN Security Council – on which Rwanda 
was then sitting as a rotating member – reiterated that while they understood 
there were difficulties in Rwanda, they were not expecting the Security Council to 
receive a “catalog of these problems,”103 so the mission needed to remain 
focused on the implementation of the peace agreement. 
Scholars like Helen Hintjens acknowledge that both “precolonial legacies 
and colonial policies contributed to the formation of [the Rwandan] state” 104 but it 
was also the increasingly “autocratic and unpopular government” that 
Habyarimana was running at the beginning of the 1990s that revealed a “last-
ditch attempt at survival”105 by executing the genocide in 1994. Habyarimana’s 
government did not suddenly plan the genocide on April 6—it had a long history 	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of development with political interest—but, as Hintjens acknowledges, there are 
three broad explanations for the genocide:  
A focus on external influences, both colonial and neo-colonial; a 
focus on domestic causes, including demographic factors and 
“ethnic” conflict; and a psychosocial account based on the 
presumed social conformism and obedience of Rwandans.106  
Unfortunately, as Rwanda moved towards genocide, the international media was 
not able to provide any context for the increasing unrest and the genocidal plans. 
The world primarily portrayed the Rwandan conflict as “resulting from ethnic 
tensions.”107 
 
The 1994 Genocide 
  On the evening of April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana, who had been 
the president of Rwanda since 1973, was delayed in Dar-es-Salaam for a 
summit. Even though he rarely traveled anywhere at night for security reasons, 
he flew home that evening in his Mystere Falcon 50 airplane.108 At 8:23 PM, just 
as Habyarimana, his closest advisers, private doctors, private secretary, personal 
security, chief of the Army, and the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, 
were cleared to land at the Kigali airport, the plane was struck by two ground-to-
air missiles, which killed everyone on board and scattered the wreckage of the 
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plane throughout the garden of the presidential palace.109A French judicial 
report—released in January 2012—exonerated the RPF and Paul Kagame after 
it suggested the missiles were fired by a Hutu rebel group associated with the 
National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (the MRND).110    
The first few hours following the airplane crash were quite hectic because 
the assassination was followed by a government troop implementation of 
roadblocks throughout Kigali as the city witnessed sporadic gunfire and 
explosions.111 Kigali was certainly not the only area of the country to witness the 
deployment of checkpoints because, elsewhere in Rwanda, people “armed to the 
teeth” had reinforced checkpoints and cars were passing through them full of 
“people with machetes.”112The killing of Tutsi and moderate Hutu political 
oppositional figures began moments after the crash, which was based on two 
“categories”:  
(a) moderate (as distinct from “Hutu power”) Hutu politicians from 
the south/central regions, most of them affiliated to the 
Movement Democratique Republicain (MDR), and (b) opposition 
leaders (Hutu and Tutsi) identified with the Parti Liberal (PL) or 
the Parti Social Democratique (PSD).113   
Sensing that a new crisis was unfolding after receiving a telephone call from the 
prime minister regarding the president’s death, Dallaire issued a “red alert” for all 	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of the United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeepers in 
the country, which meant doubling security and making the wearing of flak 
jackets compulsory.114 In a matter of hours, the first two “categories” were 
completely disposed of, which then left the death squads to the task of killing the 
Tutsi civilians. The killing of Tutsi civilians immediately revealed the “sufficiency 
of the machete wielding death squads” because of the “swiftness” of the horribly 
“rational” carnage.115 It was systematic killing and “the killings were not in any 
way clean or surgical…the use of machetes often resulted in a long and painful 
agony.”116 As one critic of the government in Kicukiro expressed immediately 
upon witnessing the early killings: “It was clear massacres were about to 
begin.”117  It was clear because of the people driving through roadblocks with 
cars full of machetes, the propaganda being broadcast over radio, and the fact 
that things were happening very quickly, “as if they had been rehearsed.” Many 
eyewitnesses, at the time, believed that the growing violence in Rwanda would 
escalate and end tragically.118  
  According to Gregory Stanton, “the diplomatic community knew about the 
crimes” being committed in February and March of 1994 through various cables 
from the US Embassy and cables from Dallaire—on top of the reports that station 
RTLM—a government controlled pro-Hutu institution—was broadcasting 
“inflammatory statements calling for hatred – indeed for extermination”—so the 
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news of the massacres on April 6 should not have been overly surprising.119 
Despite many of the early warnings, when the “feared bloodshed” began hours 
after President Habyarimana’s death, UNAMIR was completely unprepared to 
confront the “wave of terror unleashed by the Hutu extremists.”120 The new 
purpose of these UN troops—which disregarded Gen. Dallaire’s plea for more 
than help on the ground to save expatriates and the Rwandan civilians —was to 
evacuate expatriates from what was the news media characterized as “chaos,” 
renewed civil war, and “tribal fighting.”121 For UNAMIR, the increasingly 
“untenable tasks”122 of protecting themselves and civilians under the Chapter VI 
mandate became immediately apparent when 10 Belgian peacekeepers were 
murdered during the first phase of violence. However, the reality of the situation 
on the ground was not tribal fighting but genocide, and foreign leaders were well 
aware of it.123 The member states that were contributing troops to the UNAMIR 
operation adamantly said that they “could not afford to place the lives of their 
people in the hands of a cavalier UN” and the Security Council voted to reduce 
the role of UNAMIR because no country was willing to contribute troops to an 
expanded mandate or operation.124 On April 9, 1994, Belgian and French troops 
landed at the Kigali airport to rescue and evacuate foreigners from the country, 
and the UN headquarters informed Dallaire that: “only for the rescue of foreigners 
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could he exceed his mandate and use force.”125 On April 11, 1994, just days after 
the plane crash, 3900 people of 22 nationalities were evacuated from Rwanda, 
and every international embassy, except for China’s, was evacuated and 
closed—including France’s, which left behind “a staggering pile of shredded 
paper” to hide the “French links with the extremists.”126 The French link was 
controversial when they sent back peacekeeping forces in the middle of June, 
but on April 11 1994, Rwanda was essentially abandoned.  
 During the first two days of the genocide, the Interahamwe militia—which 
was formed in 1991 as a “youth group” version of Habyarimana’s MRND127—
were being collected from all parts of Rwanda in “commandeered vehicles” to 
distribute weapons, including grenades and Kalashnikov assault rifles.128  The 
headquarters for the Interahamwe, which was previously known as the Ministry 
of Youth in Kigali, was moved to Gisenyi by the militia leader, Bernard 
Munyagishari, shortly after its conception.129 The testimony of informer and 
former militia leader, Omar Serushago—outlined after the genocide in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) courtroom—that the plans for 
genocide in Gisenyi were “more advanced than anywhere else”130 in Rwanda. In 
fact, there were six groups of Interahamwe in Gisenyi, and every evening during 
the genocide they would meet together and report on the Tutsi who had been 
murdered that day.131  	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 Linda Melvern also points out that there were “sounds of screams and 
gunfire”132 all over Kigali and Gikondo, and it continued out into the countryside. 
The Interahawme were hunting for Tutsis, breaking down doors, and chasing 
people from house to house. On April 12, Jean Philippe Ceppi, a journalist for the 
French newspaper Liberation, described seeing piles of dead mutilated bodies 
that had had their breasts and penises removed by machetes by the 
Interahamwe in Gikondo.133 People were also not even safe in hospitals, where 
the Interahamwe chased Tutsi around the wards. At the end of the chase, there 
were so many dead bodies being delivered to the city morgue that they had to be 
stacked outside.134 
  One of the main instructional tools for the Interahamwe was the use of 
the Rwandan radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM).135  
The RTLM station “actively encouraged them to kill, relentlessly sending the 
message that the Tutsi were the enemy and had to be eliminated once and for 
all.”136 The MRND party, which was led by Juvenal Habyarimana, owned RTLM 
and was the group in charge of the Interahamwe.137 
  Throughout April the only thing that deterred or slowed down the killings 
were the few military operations by the RPF, or when the Tutsi population had 
been completely obliterated in a particular area. Unfortunately, as Prunier 
suggests, Gen. Dallaire and UNAMIR’s troops were “completely useless because 	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their mandate prevented them from intervening.”138 Dallaire’s intervention 
proposal, on the other hand, pushed for adoption under Chapter VII, as opposed 
to a Chapter VI observation mission, because it would involve force directed to 
stop the genocide, conduct a peace enforcement mission, assist in the return of 
refugees and displaced persons, ensure the successful delivery of humanitarian 
aid and assist in a cessation of hostilities.139 The United States consistently 
argued that the UN had an obligation to “protect the lives of the peacekeepers 
and that the failure to do so would make it harder to obtain troops for future 
operations and, perhaps, further the decline in the UN’s reputation.”140 So, on 
April 21, 1994, rather than bolstering the mission or altering its mandate, the 
Security Council decided to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR and left a “skeletal 
force” of 450141 to help Commander Gen. Romeo Dallaire somehow broker a 
cease-fire agreement between the RPF and the Rwandan government,142 which 
did not help the innocent civilians and noncombatants being slaughtered. U.S 
Colonel, Scott Feil, suggests that the implementation of the 5000 troops Dallaire 
requested between April 7 and April 21, 1994, would have “significantly altered 
the outcome of the conflict.”143 A minority of others, such as Alan Kuperman, a 
controversial scholar known for his critical stance on humanitarian military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 261.  
139 Scott Feil, “Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in 
Rwanda,” A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: 
Carnegie Corporation, 1998): 8. 
140 Barnett, “Security Council Indifference and Genocide in Rwanda,” 560.  
141 Feil, “Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda,” 
9.  
142 Barnett, “Security Council Indifference and Genocide in Rwanda,” 560.  
143 Feil, “Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda,” 
3. 
	   	    
	  24	  
intervention, claim that “a realistic intervention could not have prevented the 
genocide.”144   
 Almost immediately after making a decision to withdraw UNAMIR troops, 
the UN and the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, decided to “revisit” the 
decision, which Michael Barnett suggests was done because they were “highly 
embarrassed” on an international level from their previous decision.145 The 
Security Council unveiled another plan at the end of April that created an image 
that the UN was “poised for action” but the U.S. agreed that it probably would not 
have brought an end to the genocide, which is reflected in the United States’ 
immediate criticism.146 The revisited decision to send 5000 troops to Kigali was 
sent back to the drawing board again to sit and wait until late June – in the final 
days of the genocide – when the UN authorized a French operation in southern 
Rwanda to protect refugees.147  
 On April 24, 1994, Oxfam, the international aid organization, described 
the crisis in Rwanda as genocide148 while western politicians and most of the 
international media were describing it as “ethnic cleansing” and “tribal warfare.” 
However, as Dallaire points out, “calling it ethnic cleansing just did not hit the 
mark,” so he began using the word genocide on his records after April 24. 
Likewise, the Pope condemned the violence in Rwanda on April 27 by using the 
word “genocide”149 to describe the massacre, which was widely quoted in the 	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western news media. On April 29, UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
acknowledged that the killing in Rwanda was “distinct from the war, although 
related to it,”150 but setting a plan in motion to end the atrocities to deliver 
peacekeepers was not there until July.  
Genocide or the “g-word,” as Stanton outlines, was certainly a sore spot 
for the U.S. government and policymakers that did not want to get involved in an 
African ‘civil war’ or another ’quagmire’ after Somalia.151  Indeed, the looping 
CNN coverage of American UN peacekeepers dragged through the streets of 
Somalia after the “Blackhawk Down” incident in 1993, resulted in President 
Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), signed on May 3, 1994, 
and designed to limit the United States’ involvement in UN peacekeeping 
operations.152 PDD 25 allowed intervention in cases of “genocide,”153 but insisted 
that any UN peacekeeping intervention must be in the interests of the US. As 
long as the US ignored or denied the fact that genocide was indeed taking place 
in Rwanda, they avoided their “moral duty to intervene.”154 Article 8 of the 
Genocide Convention states that “Contracting Parties may call upon the 
competent organs of the U.N.,”155but it does not outline any particular legal 
obligation for a country to take action outside of their own national legislation. 
After months of legal advisors telling the American government not to call the 
Rwandan killings genocide, on June 10, 1994—on the same day that the New 	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York Times156 ridiculed the government for avoiding Rwanda—the United States 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, finally called the massacres in Rwanda 
genocide.157 By that point, the bulk of the killing was already over. 
On June 18, 1994, the French sent in Operation Turquoise, which was 
able to save more than 10,000 people living in western Rwanda. However, at the 
same time, it also permitted the leaders of the genocide to escape into Zaire.158 
Operation Turquoise was also obviously not able to completely stop the slaughter 
because roughly 80% of the victims of the genocide—close to 800,000 people—
had been killed between the second week of April and the third week of May.159  
Despite the lives saved by the operation, Operation Turquoise also met a 
considerable amount of criticism from General Dallaire, as well as the RPF 
leader, Paul Kagame.160 Kagame described the mission as “treacherous” 
because the French had a significant role in training the presidential guards and 
supplying the Interahamwe, Hutu extremists, with training and weapons in the 
past.161   
On Friday, July 1, just as the English Tutsi led RPF was about to take 
control of Kigali after a military victory, the French informed the United Nations 
that they would be setting up a safe zone in southwestern Rwanda, which was 
initiated after they found 10,000 bodies and 400 sick and frail Tutsis emerging 
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from a forest in Bisesero.162 One of the main motivations behind the 
implementation of the “secure humanitarian zone” was the fact that the French 
and the RPF were on the verge of a conflict between each other at the beginning 
of July, which certainly played well for the Interahamwe, the genocidal Hutu 
militia, who were trying to keep the RPF out of Kigali.163 Part of the conflict 
between the French and the RPF arose because of the support that the French 
military was supplying the interim Rwandan government. The interim government 
support was quickly revoked on July 15 when the French government informed 
the French representative in Goma, Yannick Gerard, that “the authorities bear a 
heavy responsibility for the genocide,” and that “France will make no 
accommodation with the killers and their commanders.”164  
On July 18, 1994, the RPF took over Gisenyi, the genocide ended, and a 
new Rwandan government—composed mainly of RPF members—was formed in 
Kigali, which “was an attempt at some sort of normalization for first time since 6 
April.”165  During the previous three months, the country had seen more than ten 
percent of its population killed and another thirty percent of its population sent 
into exile, which left Rwanda  “in a complete state of disarray.”166 Between April 
6, 1994 and July 18, 1994, there were roughly 333 1/3 deaths per hour, and 5 ½ 
deaths per minute—greater than five times that of the killing during the Holocaust 
and committed with machetes.167 The Rwandan genocide was in no way a brief 
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incident of “tribal warfare” or “civil war,” and despite close to one million deaths, 
the international community and western news media broadcasters often ignored 
and misreported it. 
 
The Media and the Genocide 
  Many media and genocide scholars who identify as “interventionists”—
those who support humanitarian intervention—have suggested—through 
studying the impact of the media on the Rwandan genocide—that the “media 
have a responsibility to alert the world to circumstances such as Rwanda early, 
loud, and unwaveringly.”168 Steven Livingston, Gerard Prunier, Linda Melvern, 
Richard Dowden, Allan Thompson and Amanda Grzyb agree that the media 
coverage of the Rwandan genocide was poorly executed, inaccurate, and one of 
the reasons why the international community turned a blind eye to the genocide 
as it was happening. However, those who identify with Livingston’s term 
“realists,”169 anti-interventionists believe that international media is “fickle, shifting 
from one crisis to the next,”170 and do not have a direct impact on government 
policy and foreign intervention in situations of crisis. 
Livingston suggests that the US media’s portrayal of international crises is 
“fleeting, ephemeral and all too typically frivolous:”171  
Media content is heavily laden with emotional freight concerning 
distant injustices and brewing evil. In populating the news with 	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victims of one sort or another, calculations of national interest are 
supplanted by mere sentimentality. This is the core principle at 
the heart of the realist critique of the media and foreign 
policymaking.172  
However, as Kennan, Kurtz, Patterson and Livingston suggest,173 one of the 
main reasons why the American media does not have a significant impact on 
foreign policymaking is because it focuses on entertainment stories instead of 
‘real’ news. Between 1990 and 1998, American news networks “more than 
doubled” the time given to celebrity/entertainment stories, disasters, accidents 
and crime, which they did while “decreasing the time spent on policy and 
international affairs.”174 Livingston’s systematic analysis of American news media 
shows that until September 2001, international news took up a small portion of 
the nightly news broadcast because all three American news networks were 
devoting a third of their broadcasts to the stories that fell into the category of 
“lifestyle, features and crime.”175 As Steven Livingston outlines in his studies on 
American television news, over roughly a twenty-year period—between 1972 and 
1991—40% of American television news content focused, in some way, on 
international events.176 At the end of the Cold War, as Livingston suggests, 
American news media changed their focus drastically to other more profitable 
issues, which was driven by the neoliberal ideology developed during the Reagan 
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and Bush era.177 After 1991, domestic news content made its way onto American 
news networks for 73% of the stories, and during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, 
only one in four news network stories were concerned about international 
events.178  
  The limited international coverage in the spring of 1994 was focused on 
the military coup and the civil unrest in Haiti, which led to refugees fleeing to 
Florida; the South African elections, which Nelson Mandela won; and the civil war 
in Bosnia, which received a significant amount of attention in April and May.179 
Not only were these international stories competing with each other—as was the 
case during the summer of 1994—humanitarian crises are often eclipsed by 
news that is more ‘entertaining’ in nature.  For example, climaxing on June 17 
1994, the O.J. Simpson story and images of him driving down the freeway in his 
white bronco received more attention than any other news story and “more 
American network news coverage than the systematic murder of over 800,000 
people.”180 It was not until late July or August when the international media 
turned towards Rwanda, but at that point, the stories were primarily centered on 
the thousands of Hutu refugees suffering from malnutrition and cholera in Zaire.  
  In retrospect, the Western media in general often blame the international 
community for their poor initial response to the genocide, but as Alan Kuperman 
points out, the media also needs to share the blame for their inability to recognize 
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and accurately report the carnage on the ground in Rwanda.181 In a report for the 
Foreign Press Institute, Kuperman highlights the “four lapses” that many 
journalists committed during the first weeks of the Rwandan genocide. Firstly, the 
news media misunderstood the actions in Rwanda as a “civil war,” which was 
clearly influenced by the history of war that Rwanda experienced during 1959, 
1963, 1990, and 1993. However, the mass violence that broke across Rwanda 
on April 7 was very different than the civil unrest in the 1960s and the Tutsi 
refugee rebel invasion in the 1990s.182 The second major “lapse” that Kuperman 
reveals is that many news media outlets were reporting that the violence in 
Rwanda was beginning to get better into the second week of the genocide, when, 
in fact, it was actually getting much worse. For example, The New York Times 
claimed that violence “appeared to slacken” and Le Monde expressed that the 
fighting had “diminished in intensity.”183 The third error made by international 
media outlets and their coverage of Rwanda pertains to the death counts, which 
were often quite inaccurate and misleading. The death counts were routinely 
underestimated, especially considering that the media estimates during the 
second week did not change and groups like The New York Times and The 
Guardian often repeated statistics days after they were printed.184 The fourth and 
last mistake is the Western news organizations’ decision to focus almost entirely 
on what was happening in Kigali during the genocide, which really only affected 
four per cent of Rwanda’s population and inevitably left the overwhelming 	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majority of other tragedies that were happening all around them unreported.185  
For example, The Washington Post and The New York Times suggested that 
there was “much of the country [in] chaos” and “sketchy reports said fighting has 
spread to Rwanda’s countryside,” which both alluded to the fact that the genocide 
had spread elsewhere into the country, but very little was elaborated beyond 
those points.186 
   Justifying the poor coverage of the genocide has been difficult for many 
journalists, but Kuperman suggests that there are generally three major factors 
as to why the media failed in its coverage of Rwanda: the evacuation of foreign 
nationals left few reporters on the ground, the situation was legitimately 
confusing, and even the experts had a difficult time fully comprehending what 
was happening.187  In fact, it was not until April 19, 1994, when Human Rights 
Watch suggested that Rwanda was encountering genocide, which was really the 
first time a North American organization expressed it publicly.188 The first time the 
word genocide was used by the international media was on April 11 in the French 
newspaper Liberation.189 However, as Amanda Grzyb suggests, it is also 
important for one to expand on Kuperman’s analysis to include “an examination 
of how the media’s images of ‘Hutu’ and ’Tutsi’ fit within the confines of Western 
ideas about racial and cultural differences, ’the African’ and the supposed 
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’inevitability’ of African suffering.”190 The media in the west harshly criticized the 
American and Western politicians for failing to help the victims of the genocide 
sooner, but the media outlets also share the blame because the ‘news’ business  
is often looked to as a “surrogate early warning system.”191  
 
Conclusion 
 In the next chapter, I begin by revealing that the ABC, CBS and NBC 
television news coverage was really unaware of the context of the 1994 
genocide. The history of Rwanda is certainly somewhat complex, but that does 
not justify the reliance on stereotypes and the overall ignorance when the 
networks were unaware of what was happening. Unfortunately, ABC, CBS and 
NBC did not begin to realize the severity of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda until 
the end of July, after hundreds of thousands of people were killed.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FIRST 24 DAYS: APRIL 6, 1994 - APRIL 30, 1994 
 
Scholars from a variety of disciplines, including Steven Livingston, Allan 
Thompson, Linda Melvern, Alison Des Forges, and Amanda Grzyb, have 
criticized corporate media organizations for their response to the first month of 
the Rwandan genocide. They suggest that the coverage was inaccurate as well 
as "fleeting, ephemeral and all too typically frivolous"192 during a critical window 
for a Chapter VII military peacekeeping intervention.193 In short, the news media 
contributed to the international community’s failure to stop the genocide.  In this 
chapter, I will provide an analysis of the ABC, CBS, and NBC television news 
coverage during the first 24 days of the Rwandan genocide.  My analysis of the 
images and discourse employed by the American television networks 
demonstrates that their stories – like those published in the agenda setting 
newspapers – were inaccurate and contributed to the general confusion about 
the situation on the ground in Rwanda. In particular, the networks broadcasted 
stories filled with African stereotypes, comparisons to the previously failed 
intervention in Somalia, and egregiously false misleading information, which are 
important mistakes to learn from, because the way the American television media 
tell stories can have a distinct affect on public opinion, political intervention and 
the fate of those on the screen. The American television broadcasters have a lot 
responsibility and control over what is placed on a television screen, because, as 
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Susan Sontag suggests, “in America, the photographer is not simply the person 
who records the past, but the one who invents it.”194 During the Rwandan 
genocide, the American television media invented an image of ‘tribal warfare’ and 
‘civil war’.  
 
The Context 
On April 6, after a rocket-powered weapon shot down the aircraft carrying 
Rwandan president, Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian president, Cyprien 
Ntaryamira, media organizations around the world searched for information about 
the assassination and the massacre of Rwandan civilians that followed in its 
wake. In Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, Gerard Prunier describes the first 
night of the genocide as chaotic and confusing: 
The plane was shot down at around 8:30 PM, and by 9:15 
there were already Interahamwe roadblocks everywhere in 
town and houses were being searched. This was the cause 
of the shooting that began to be heard less than an hour 
after the president's death and not any imaginary fighting 
with the RPF. Fantastic tales have been written about those 
crucial hours on the evening of Wednesday 6 April 1994.195 
As Prunier outlines, immediately following the plane crash, Kigali and the 
countryside witnessed a number of dramatic events in a very short period of time. 
On the night of the assassination, as Alison Des Forges suggests, “sporadic 	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gunfire began almost immediately after the crash,” which initiated a trend 
dedicated to speed and time that continued for the rest of the genocide. With the 
“allegations of RPF responsibility for the crime,”196 the mystery around the 
assassination began a chain of events that led to more “fantastic tales.”197 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of consensus surrounding who actually 
assassinated Habyarimana, ‘time’ and ‘speed’ became two factors that made it 
difficult for the international journalists to present accurate reports, especially 
since they were not in the country on April 6. From the beginning, the genocide 
was moving very quickly and time became a major factor, which inevitably left 
room for the journalists to overlook important details—especially in a country 
about which they knew very little.  
Rwanda is situated within the Central African Time zone, which is six 
hours ahead of the Eastern Time zone, and nine hours ahead of the Pacific Time 
zone.198 Therefore, within the first few hours after Habyarimana’s death, the 
amount of information that ABC, CBS, and NBC could actually obtain was quite 
limited. For example, Mark Doyle, who was in Kenya working for the BBC on 
April 6, travelled to Uganda with a dozen other journalists after receiving word 
that Habyarimana’s plane had crashed in Kigali. Even after he arrived in Uganda 
on the 6, Doyle had difficulty understanding the scope and nature of the 
massacres:   
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I have to admit that during the first few days, I, like others, 
got the story terribly wrong. Down on the ground, up close--if 
you get close enough, safely enough--it did look at first like 
chaos. I said so. I use the word chaos. What I could see 
clearly in the first few days was the shooting war between 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the government, and 
the dead bodies.  It was not clear who had killed whom, not 
at first, and the shooting war appeared chaotic with shifting 
front lines, a lot of noise and a lot of red hot lead flying 
around.199   
Another journalist, Anne Chaon, who reported for Agence France-Presse (AFP) 
in the early days of the genocide, suggests that a lack of background knowledge 
and general confusion was to blame:  
Most journalists are not experts in genocide. Many of them—
myself included—arrived in Rwanda with very little 
knowledge of the country. So, it was tempting, especially at 
the beginning, to speak of the civil war, of these massacres 
as a perverse return of the old war, and to link these 
massacres to previous massacres since 1959. We failed to 
understand that the killing was something totally new, that 
this was not a continuity of what happened before.200 
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On April 6 and 7, American television broadcasters based their reports on a 
trickle of information coming out of Rwanda.  They did not have their own 
correspondents on the ground, and when they did arrive on April 10 and 11, 
those journalists knew very little about Rwanda’s pre-colonial, colonial, and post-
colonial history.   
Jo Ellen Fair and Lisa Parks argue that "coverage of Rwanda’s 1994 
genocide was challenging" because “reporters were dropped into a region where 
they knew little, and where their own government advocated disinterested 
noninvolvement.”201 Such “disinterested noninvolvement” was evident on the 
evening of April 9, 1994, when NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams presented 
a two minute and fifty second piece on Rwanda that concluded by comparing the 
genocide to the 1993 conflict in Somalia. At the very end of the segment, Tom 
Pettit, an NBC reporter in Washington, explained that, "Nobody here or there 
wants another Somalia."202 This statement was significant because, as Steven 
Livingston explains, "to understand American news coverage and government 
policy concerning the 1994 Rwanda genocide, one must begin with the 1992-93 
United States intervention in Somalia."203   
According to David Brunk, "Somalia was a humanitarian intervention gone 
horribly wrong."204 The Somalian relief mission began in 1991 after the fall of 
Siad Barre’s government, and was originally designed as an operation to 	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"Restore Hope."205 Towards the end, the mission transformed into a "state 
building operation," which consisted of UN troops—mainly composed of a US 
contingent—confronting the warlord of Mogadishu, Mohamed Farah Aideed. 
However, everything changed on October 3, 1993, during the Battle of 
Mogadishu, when an American helicopter crashed in the streets of Mogadishu 
after being shot down by a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and the image of 
dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets landed in newspapers 
and on television screens all over the planet. On October 6, 1993, the Clinton 
administration removed all of the American forces from combat, and left a small 
contingent there for “self-defense.”  For the west, the Somalia incident was a 
pivotal geopolitical event that transformed the future of US foreign-policy 
decisions. In April 1994, Rwanda forced the US to recall, as Des Forges outlines, 
“the unfortunate consequences of a too assertive policy in Somalia, where the 
need for neutrality was ignored and failure ensued.”206  
On April 9, 1994—just seven months after the burned soldier’s body was 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu—the American television news 
networks found themselves reporting on another ‘conflict’ in Africa. Media 
coverage is often considered one of the many reasons why the Clinton 
administration removed itself from Somalia, but some believe that the media also 
played an integral role influencing the military to intervene in the Somalian 
humanitarian crisis in the first place. For example, as Steven Livingston 
suggests, many still look to "the television coverage of the horrific famine, fighting 	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and disease"207 because the television coverage became the trigger for the 
American humanitarian response that followed the pictures on the screen. 
American statesman, George Kennan, explained:  
There can be no question that the reason for this acceptance 
lies primarily with the exposure of the Somalia situation by 
the American media, above all, television. The reaction 
would have been unthinkable without this exposure. The 
reaction was an emotional one, occasioned by the sight of 
the suffering of the starving people in question.208  
Livingston uses the term “CNN Effect” to describe how media coverage relates to 
political intervention and humanitarian crises.  He suggests that the media can 
act as an "accelerant" or as "policy agenda setters" by raising "the evidence of an 
issue, placing it before higher-level policymakers."209 Therefore, because of the 
media’s emphasis of American deaths in Somalia, a direct relationship emerged 
between the anti-interventionist backlash and US policy decisions six months 
later during the Rwanda genocide.210 David Brunk calls the negative impact that 
the Somalia influence had on other policy decisions the "Somalia syndrome," 
which is a "powerful skepticism of ‘benevolent intervention’ operations in volatile 
humanitarian crises.”211 Steven Livingston explains that the media's connection 
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to public opinion is indeed a reality of the global television age, because media, 
which influences politicians, can alter public opinion: 
…pictures of a dead American soldier being dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu revived some of the same 
fears and concerns evoked by Vietnam. The Clinton 
administration’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from 
Somalia as soon as possible was the more immediate result. 
As The New York Times put it, the recent fighting 
“crystallized American public opinion on an issue that 
previously was not particularly pressing to the average 
citizen. And the pictures of a dead American soldier being 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu seem to have 
made it all but impossible for Mr. Clinton to change many 
minds.”212   
However, despite the ability to alter public opinion, and affect political 
intervention, between 1990 and 1998, the American television media devoted 
most of their time to "celebrity and entertainment, disasters accidents and crime, 
while decreasing the time spent on policy and international affairs.”213 From 1993 
to 1995, only “one in four network news stories concerned international 
events."214  
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In April 1994, NBC215 was the only network to make any direct 
comparisons between Rwanda and Somalia, and in doing so, I would suggest 
that it participated in the “Somalia Syndrome,” and generated familiar Western 
stereotypes about the African continent. Brunk suggests that, “the memory and 
lessons derived from the United Nations’ Operation in Somalia (and the U.S. role 
therein) cast a haunting shadow over future peace-keeping missions, particularly 
during the emerging crisis in Rwanda.”216 Alan Kuperman suggests that fears 
about “another Somalia” is one reason why government officials looked away: 
In the wake of the Somalia debacle just six months earlier... 
it is possible that U.S. officials, consciously or otherwise, 
dismissed initial reports of large-scale violence in Rwanda 
because such information would have raised the prospect of 
another UN or U.S. humanitarian intervention that they 
plainly did not want to contemplate.217    
The fear of another ‘failed state’ is constructed through language that is used to 
describe what was, in reality, a case of genocide. Arthur Klinghoffer writes, 
"descent into genocide became blurred with the civil war, and the Somalia image 
of a ‘failed state’ with random violence masked the actual premeditation and 
directing role of the Hutu extremists in the interim government.’’218  
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The myth of ‘chaos’ both masked the truth and augmented the reality of 
what was actually happening in April of 1994. Alison Des Forges of Human 
Rights Watch writes:  
If Washington officials described the killings as ‘chaos’, it 
was in part because they saw Rwanda through the prism of 
Somalia. In this light, Rwanda was another ‘‘failed state,’’ 
just one more of a series of political disasters on the 
continent. In such a case, they reasoned, any intervention 
would have to be large-scale and costly and would probably 
produce no measurable improvement anyway.219 
The indelible images from Mogadishu in October 1993 had a detrimental effect 
on the American political response to the Rwandan genocide, and provided a 
point of comparison to another “failed state” for journalists seeking a way to 
contextualize humanitarian intervention. The “Somalia Syndrome” was especially 
evident at the end of July, as I outline in Chapter III, when the American 
television news broadcasters repeated that the “Rwandese had a very unlucky 
happenstance of coming right after the international experience in Somalia”220 
because “The White House wants no repeat of the disaster in Somalia.”221  
However, not only was the American political response shaping the way in 
which the American television media presented stories on Rwanda, the television 
news media had to remember that, at the end of the day, it was a “news 
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factory,”222  and the story on the screen needed to be able to sell, which genocide 
does not do well when it was competing against “soap operas and game 
shows.”223 Jean Seaton explains: "contemporary news is processed in what are 
really multinational news factories, and is subject to the rationalizations of the 
market as any other commodity.”224 Driven by the sensational and less serious 
‘news’, "the institutions that produce news”—ABC, CBS, and NBC—“are 
themselves in turn only minor parts of a vast entertainment industry,”225 and the 
“news factories” inevitably play a substantial role in deciding what will be in a 
broadcast. Just like any other commodity, the retailer (which in this case is the 
television network) must cater to the wants of the viewers/consumers. Seaton 
writes: 
Nevertheless how news of wars is constructed and sold is, 
more than ever, subject to the constraints of a ferociously 
competitive market. Stories of wars in faraway places have 
to attract audiences to sell to advertisers in competition with 
soap operas and game shows. 226  
With the market model driving the production of television news, American 
television news networks "devoted relatively little attention to the systematic 
extermination of nearly a million people" because the Somalia Syndrome does 
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not “attract audiences to sell to advertisers.”227 Instead of investing resources in 
the reportage of genocide in Rwanda, the television news networks attracted 
audiences in June with the O.J. Simpson trial. Overall, according to Livingston, 
“O.J. Simpson's trial received more American network news coverage than the 
systematic murder of over 800 thousand people."228  
For Livingston, the “most disturbing” element is the “suggestion that the 
U.S. foreign policy agenda itself is at times merely a reflection of news 
content.”229 Former Secretary of State, James Baker, cautioned against using 
media reports as the basis for international policy: 
All too often, television is what determines what is a crisis. 
Television concluded the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and 
the fighting in the Balkans was a crisis, and they began to cover it 
and cover it. And so the Clinton administration (was left) to find a 
way to do something. (Yet) they didn’t do that in Rwanda where 
the excesses were every bit as bad, if not worse. And so, you 
have to ask yourself, does that mean you should do foreign policy 
by television? Are we going to define crises according to what is 
covered, by what the editors decide to cover? I don’t think we 
should do that. 
Despite Baker’s fear about how the media influences policy, it certainly occurs.  
There are arguments about media’s significance as an agenda setter, and there 
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are “at least three understandings of the CNN effect: media as an accelerant to 
the process, as an inhibitor, and as an agenda setter.”230 It is important to 
acknowledge that “the level of interest media have and the potential 
consequence of that interest vary substantially.”231 However, that potential 
“consequence” could also mean close to one million Rwandan lives. The failure 
to understand Rwanda at the beginning of April, the attention to comparisons to 
Somalia, and the focus on the other ‘profitable’ stories, all altered the way in 
which the story of the Rwandan genocide was told to the world. 
 
The Coverage  
The American television coverage of the Rwanda genocide began on April 
6 when NBC, ABC, and CBS each aired clips ten to twenty seconds in length that 
briefly explained the president's assassination and provided very little, if any, 
additional information about the situation on the ground. For example, NBC 
produced a ten second segment at the 22-minute mark of their broadcast on the 
evening of April 6, 1994.232 During the ten-second clip, Tom Brokaw explained 
that the presidents of “Rwanda and Burundi” were killed in a plane crash, and 
that reports suggested that it was a result of “rocket fire.”233 ABC and CBS also 
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delivered similar reports about the deaths of the presidents of the “two African 
nations”234 in roughly ten second clips. 
On the following day, April 7, 1994, the networks initiated their first reports 
of massacres.  ABC World News235 with Peter Jennings described a “bloodbath” 
occurring in the “chaos overseas,”236 but the primary focus of these early stories 
was the evacuation of the approximately two hundred Americans living in 
Rwanda at the time. On CBS Evening News,237 Connie Chung used similar 
language during her broadcast, and explained that the “bloodbath is continuing in 
Central Africa.”238 (However, contrary to Chung’s suggestion, the country is 
actually situated in East Africa.) Likewise, on NBC, Tom Brokaw acknowledged 
that journalists had still not made their way into Rwanda to gather images for the 
broadcast: “There are no pictures from today, but we are told that there is a 
bloodbath underway in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda.”239 As I will outline below, 
the similarity of the networks on April 7 and their use of the word “bloodbath” was 
an introduction to the way in which the American networks continued their 
discourse similarities for the rest of the genocide. Also, on April 7, NBC, like the 
other networks, chose to air stock photographs and video captioned as “File 
Footage” of military vehicles driving up and down an unidentified road during 
what the network described as “Africa’s most savage and enduring ethnic 
feuds.”240 While the networks did not yet have a total death toll for Rwandans 	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killed on April 7, they did acknowledge the murder of eleven UN Belgian 
peacekeepers, which NBC described as an “execution.”241  
On April 8, 1994, ABC’s Diane Sawyer described the events in Rwanda as 
a “terrifying tribal war” with a “rampage [that] began two days ago.”242 Sawyer’s 
comments were placed in juxtaposition with the United States State Department 
suggesting that “250 Americans are trapped” with “thousands of Western 
civilians” “caught in the chaos.”243 During the ABC broadcast, Lindsay Hilsum—a 
BBC reporter at the time—described the massacres as an “ethnic slaughter,” a 
“long-running bloody power struggle,” and a “bloodbath [that] started 
Wednesday” when “Rwanda’s army went on a rampage of killing.”244 Hilsum did 
not highlight the victims’ identities, and like the other networks, she was unable to 
specify who was doing the killing. Also, on April 8, Tom Brokaw of NBC news 
explained that, "when it comes to turmoil and bloodshed, nothing compares to 
Central Africa."245 NBC’s statement prefaced a discussion on the Westerners and 
American citizens trapped in Rwanda. For example, NBC explained that "there 
are 255 American civilians in Rwanda" and fighting spread from around the US 
Embassy to a school where "as many as 36 Americans live and work."246 CBS 
explained that the “horrified foreigners were rescued from the savagery of the 
ethnic warfare in Rwanda today” as they escaped an “orgy of violence.”247  
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On the evening of April 9, 1994, NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams 
presented a two minute and fifty second piece on Rwanda half way through their 
broadcast—one of the longest pieces on Rwanda by any of the three networks 
for the entire month of April. One of the most significant moments in this 
broadcast came at the very end of the segment when Tom Pettit—an NBC 
journalist broadcasting from in front of The White House—ended by showing file 
images of UN peacekeeping vehicles driving in an unnamed country and this 
provocative statement: "Nobody here or there wants another Somalia."248 As I 
previously suggested, the comparisons to Somalia were very important for the 
UN’s approaches to intervention and the perpetuation of ‘African’ related myths 
and stereotypes.  
On April 11, ABC World News with Peter Jennings began a piece on 
Rwanda stating that all of the Americans and foreigners who wanted to leave 
Rwanda had left the “murder and chaos” and escaped the “drunken men hacking 
their victims with machetes.”249 This description was followed by an interview with 
an unnamed Western foreigner, from an unidentified country, about to be 
evacuated from Rwanda, who explained: “They are like animals. They are worse 
than animals.  I can’t believe it. I can’t believe God created people like that.”250  
ABC also reported on the plight of the gorillas:   
Another casualty of the tribal war in Rwanda, may be the 
worlds last mountain gorillas—the ones written about by the 
late Diane Fosse and the subject of the movie Gorillas in the 	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Mist.  There are 650 gorillas left—half of them are in the 
mountains of Rwanda.  Wildlife project managers who care 
for them have fled—leaving the gorillas at the mercy of 
poachers.251   
 During NBC’s April 11 report, Tom Brokaw explained that the "carnage" and 
"tribal fighting” continued in Rwanda for a fifth day, and it had forced the 
evacuation of hundreds of foreigners and aid workers.252 NBC then went to a clip 
of Linda Vester—who arrived in Rwanda that day—explaining that "death is 
everywhere" in Rwanda, with the words "BLOODY STREETS" highlighted at the 
bottom of the screen.253 These were the first real time (not file footage) images to 
come out of Rwanda. They showed dead bodies on the ground in front of 
houses, captured by a fast-moving vehicle with a camera mounted on the back 
as it passed by the victims on the street. In front of the cameraman was a 
garbage truck full of dead bodies, which was followed by Vester explaining that 
the "carnage is everywhere" and that the city "smells of death." Vester never 
identified the victims or the perpetrators, but she did suggest that “Government 
loyalists of the Hutu tribe and rebels of the minority Tutsi tribe seem bent on 
killing each other at every turn.”254 Vester’s piece created another ambiguous 
explanation for the genocide that fed further myth making: she was unaware that 
the Hutu were specifically targeting the Tutsi. Also, although very brief, NBC and 
CBS presented footage for the first time on April 11 that was probably the most 
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significant visual record of massacres in Rwanda; a moment that genocide 
scholars and documentaries reference as the only killing that was actually caught 
on camera. The infamous grainy video footage captured by Nick Hughes—which 
I discuss at length below255—shows a distant image of an individual holding a 
machete and striking at people on the street where “three women can be seen 
pleading for their lives” as they were “savagely beaten, then hacked to death by 
soldiers.”256  
On April 12, NBC broadcasted an extremely short, general piece that 
explained only that unidentified “peacekeepers” would be killed if they stayed in 
Kigali, and that the crisis was still "ongoing" in Rwanda.257 The next day, on April 
13, Tom Brokaw explained that Belgium had decided to pull all of their soldiers 
out of Rwanda and the Secretary-General of the UN also considered that it might 
be necessary to pull the rest of the UN force out of Rwanda.258 At the end of the 
story, NBC also explained that Belgian paratroopers rescued a number of foreign 
nationals from a medical facility in Rwanda. During the NBC clip, Tom Brokaw 
explained that Belgian paratroopers outside of Kigali rescued "18 medical 
workers" and foreigners from a "remote mental health facility,” and left, without 
explanation, “some 200 other patients behind.”259 All of this was explained over 
top of powerful images of the patients from the hospital holding their hands up to 
the camera.260 In fact, the powerful images with the Belgian paratroopers 	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evacuating the foreigners from the psychiatric hospital are also the subject of an 
analysis by Amanda Grzyb, who examined the Globe and Mail’s coverage of the 
genocide. The image Grzyb analyzes was published on April 14, 1994, in the 
Globe above the caption: “TERRIFYING ESCAPE: Belgian paratroopers lead a 
frightened woman from a crowd in Kigali yesterday. Rebels and government 
troops continued to battle in the Rwandan capital.”261 Surprisingly, unlike the 
television coverage that explained that the Western medical workers were 
working at the ‘remote mental health facility’, the Globe incorrectly depicted a 
completely different narrative—one that suggested that “the Rwandans are a 
menacing bunch,”262 which aligned with some of the other television news 
stereotypes. Therefore, on April 13, NBC actually had part of the overall story 
correct: they were able to correctly identify the psychiatric patients and the 
situation at the mental health facility.  
 On April 15, NBC’s Linda Vester reported from Rwanda that UN workers 
felt that the “old tribal war” was going to continue until “no one is left standing,” 
that the "civil war" was "rapidly encroaching on their safe zone" and that 
peacekeepers were withdrawing to let the Rwandans “fight it out."263 At the same 
time, there was an arresting report on April 15 on NBC – the first and only of its 
kind on any of the networks – with a Rwandan man making an emotional plea 
directly to a Belgian soldier.  The man said, “we are trying to remain calm, but 
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your decision to leave, this is very bad."264 Immediately following that emotional 
filmed confrontation, Vester explained that the relief workers were "caught in the 
crossfire" as they attempted to exit the country, and then interviewed a Belgian 
soldier who was "relieved" to be leaving: "Frankly, the Rwandans are becoming 
crazy. They are becoming savages."265 Vester followed that clip and finished the 
piece by saying that all of the troops have now pulled out of Rwanda and "left 
behind a brutal conflict, with no end in sight."266 
After April 15, the American television networks dramatically scaled back 
their coverage on Rwanda.  On April 16, ABC presented a very brief ten second 
story regarding the Belgian troops returning home from Rwanda. Far from 
rejoicing, the troops were shown destroying their United Nations berets because, 
in the words of Renee Poussaint, “they were disgusted…all they could do was 
stand by and watch as massacres were committed right before their eyes.”267 
This story was an anomaly, departing from the general tone of Rwanda reportage 
up to that point. Despite the fact that the story was very short, it suggested that 
ABC could be shifting its take on Rwanda, a change that was not, in fact, borne 
out in the subsequent coverage. The next Rwanda story on ABC, aired on April 
19 and it resorted to typical descriptions of the “butchery” in Rwanda occurring 
because of the “civil war.”268   
On April 21, as Des Forges outlines, “the Security Council withdrew most 
of the U.N. troops and left only a few hundred peacekeepers to protect civilians 	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already directly under the U.N. flag.”269  On April 22, CBS reported that the UN 
was pulling 400 troops out of Rwanda because they were “giving up on the 
bloodbath.”270 CBS also mentioned the vote by the UN Security Council on the 
evening of April 21 to remove almost all of the peacekeepers from Rwanda. ABC, 
CBS, and NBC provided very little coverage of Rwanda after they reported on the 
UN withdrawal on April 21; however, on April 25, the words ‘civil war’ and ‘tribal 
warfare’ were briefly replaced by ‘genocide.’271 The first mention of the word 
genocide happened during an April 25 interview on CBS, when Dr. Rony 
Zachariah, from Doctors Without Borders, was interviewed by telephone in 
Burundi. He stated, “ It is probably the biggest genocide that humanity has faced 
over the past 140 years.  And we have had to leave, because even a minimum 
level of security could not be guaranteed.” 272 The other networks were not 
forthcoming with the genocide label, although they did acknowledge the horrific 
nature of the mass killing in Rwanda. Peter Jennings of ABC covered a radio 
broadcast from the pro-Hutu RTLM station in Rwanda requesting troops to 
increase killing, and then concluded his broadcast by acknowledging that over 
100,000 Rwandans had died since April 6 in the “civil war.”273 Connie Chung, of 
CBS, prefaced their coverage of “piles of dead victims of the tribal clashes 
between Hutus and Tutsis” with a warning: “A warning—these pictures are 
graphic, but they do tell the story.”  The warning was followed by the Nick 
Hughes video (first revealed on April 11) that captured the individual being killed 	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and an image of very large piles of dead bodies with a pool of blood flowing from 
the dead laying in the street.274  
At the end of April, a new frame emerged on both CBS and ABC in which 
they prefaced their visual images with similar warnings about graphic content.  
For example, on April 28, CBS explained that, “in Rwanda, history is being 
written in blood”—followed by the warning that: “like the month-long Rwandan 
civil war itself, the pictures in this report are both gruesome and graphic.”275 
Likewise, on April 28, ABC presented a similar warning for its viewers: “Now, 
what you’re about to see, is not easy to look at.”276 Following the warning, ABC’s 
John McWethy presented a story about the genocide: 
The savagery in Rwanda is turning out to be far worse than 
anyone had imagined…there is also a growing realization that 
the killing is not just some tribal feud, but rather a calculated 
attempt by factions in Rwanda’s military to exterminate both the 
country’s minority population, and any of the majority Hutu tribe 
who were willing to share power.277   
That moment marked a significant shift in the master narrative, one in which past 
reportage was potentially corrected and the full extent of the violence in Rwanda 
was recognized.  The discourse was no longer about “civil war,” but about the 
use and avoidance of the word “genocide” in the international community. For 
instance, in an additional April 28 report, ABC quoted Christine Shelly, the U.S. 
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State Department spokesperson as saying: "It is far too early to officially call it 
genocide…the situation is beginning to fit the definition…it appears that much of 
this is directed towards particular ethnic groups, certainly the types of actions 
being committed and the extent of the killings also would suggest that this type of 
activity is taking place.”278 ABC balanced the State Department’s position with an 
opposing point of view: "others say evidence of genocide in Rwanda is already 
in,” such as Roger Winter, the US Director for the Committee on Refugees, who 
explained during an interview that: “[It is] really appropriate to use the word 
genocide.”279 ABC finished the two-minute segment by explaining that, “beyond 
intensifying diplomacy and sending emergency food, the Clinton administration 
says there is little the U.S. can do.”280  
On April 30, 1994, CBS aired its last story on Rwanda for the month of 
April, and – at a length of three minutes and ten seconds – produced its longest 
story on Rwanda that month. United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, 
explained that, “something has to be done” to stop the killing and he wanted an 
“African contribution” 281 to the presence in Rwanda. After the interview with 
Boutros-Ghali, CBS’ Giselle Fernandez reported: 
While the world reacts to the human suffering in Rwanda by 
sending aid, the deployment of an extensive force seems 
unlikely. The US and most Western States seem more than 
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resistant to risk any lives in a country where ethnic warfare is 
only likely to escalate.282 
At the end of April, the American television news broadcasters started to highlight 
that the international community was avoiding the use of the word genocide to 
describe the massacres in Rwanda because they were not willing to “risk any 
lives.” However, as Des Forges suggests, the word genocide is incredibly 
powerful, and she believes that “opposition to the genocide would have saved 
hundreds of thousands of lives,” and “would have required no military force and 
no expense.”283 At the end of April, the American television news broadcasters 
identified the genocide in interviews with individuals who described it as such. 
However, if the American television media, and more specifically the American 
government, had “unambiguously called the genocide by its awful name, they 
would have shattered the masquerade of legitimacy created by the interim 
government and forced Rwandans to confront the evil they were doing.”284 
Recognition of the power of the word genocide was certainly highlighted by the 
“frequently ignored nonpermanent members of the Security Council,”285 such as 
Nigeria, the Czech Republic, Spain, Argentina, and New Zealand, who took on 
the role of trying to enforce a commitment to action. While the West “seem[ed] 
more than resistant to risk any lives”286 in a “tribal war,” the Czech representative 
declared the opposite: “Rwanda is not a priority for the Czech government, but as 
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a human being I cannot sit here and do nothing.”287 Unfortunately, despite 
occasionally acknowledging the genocide at the end of April, it was not until the 
end of July when the American television media really “unambiguously called the 
genocide by its awful name,”288 but, by that point, it really did not force the 
“Rwandans to confront the evil they were doing,” because the perpetrators were 
busy mixing in with other Rwandan refugees in Zaire. 
 
Stereotyping the “tribal war” 
Throughout April of 1994, ABC, CBS, and NBC nightly news broadcasts 
constructed a ‘nameless’ stereotypical ‘tribal’ ‘African’ as one of the main 
characters in their coverage of the Rwandan genocide. This trend began with the 
assassination of President Habyarimana, whom none of the three networks 
called by name, either immediately after the plane crash or throughout the weeks 
of intensive coverage that followed. If the president of a Western nation were 
killed in a plane crash, would the American television news media dare neglect to 
mention his or her name? Mel McNulty suggests that in the case of Rwanda, 
Western news consumers were "fed an occasional series of unlinked reports 
about seemingly unrelated crises, which generally fitted into the typical African 
mould of biblical catastrophes."289  
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The development of the ‘African’ myth is accomplished through 
stereotypical or generalized discourse altered through cultural convention, which 
eventually creates a mythologized ‘meaning’. Like Mel McNulty, Jo Ellen Fair 
suggests that the Western mainstream media commonly presents ‘Africans’ as 
“black,” “primitive” and “savage” people who are often classified as the ‘Other’ to 
the Western Self.290 Examples of this superficial "duality" were evident when 
ABC, CBS, and NBC suggested that “Africa’s” “savage” “enduring” “ethnic feuds” 
were creating “chaos” and a full out “bloodbath.” That discourse presented a 
mental image that is traditionally associated with historical postcolonial 
discourse; the tradition of viewing African conflicts as the exclusive domain of the 
‘savages’ over ‘there’. The perpetuation of these stereotypes influenced the 
enduring colonial myth of race-based difference. When the television news 
networks presented explicitly racist discourse, it reinvigorated myths that the 
African Other is somehow less than human. As Stuart Hall suggests, this 
oppositional logic can be generated by seemingly harmless organizational 
discourse.  He writes: 
Racialized discourse is structured by a set of binary 
oppositions. There is the powerful opposition between 
‘civilization’ (white) and ‘savagery’ (black). There is the 
opposition between a biological or bodily characteristics of 
the ‘black’ and the ‘white’ ‘races’, polarized into their extreme 
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opposites--each the signifiers of an absolute difference 
between human 'types’ or species.291 
The continuous use of the racist myth enabled the viewers of the April 1994 
network news broadcasts to disassociate themselves quite easily from Rwandan 
suffering. This sort of dehumanization was particularly evident on April 11, when 
the anonymous foreigner on ABC described the Rwandans as "worse than 
animals."  This statement was further exacerbated by the subsequent story about 
the other “casualty of the tribal war in Rwanda:”292 the gorillas.  Viewers were 
faced with a disturbing segue that included footage from the film Gorillas in the 
Mist, creating a juxtaposition between the poor ‘helpless’ ‘wild’ and ‘savage’ 
gorillas and the Rwandans who are "like animals" or even "worse than animals." 
One could even argue that this inappropriate juxtaposition placed Rwandans 
below that of the "world's last mountain gorillas," because they were essentially 
blaming the “animals”—the Tutsi caretakers of the gorillas running from the 
Hutu—for making these gorillas a “casualty of the tribal war."293  
The compartmentalization of Rwandans into binaries based on racist 
signifiers was “typical of US coverage of Africa generally.”294 Fair and Parks 
write:  
Journalists relied on stereotypes—thoroughly tested by news 
organizations in stories set in other African countries, such 
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as Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan—that 
characterized the genocide in Rwanda as a result of some 
inexplicable uncontrollable primordial tribalism that drove 
Hutus and Tutsis to murder.295 
As Fair and Parks suggest, we must examine the language journalists used to 
describe the events unfolding in Rwanda. For example, on April 7, all three 
networks established a linguistic template, which subsequent coverage followed. 
The stage was set, and the discourse did not shift until the word “genocide” was 
finally introduced into the broadcasts late in the month of April. None of the early 
network coverage included images, but all three referred to Rwanda as a 
"bloodbath” with absolute continuity—a continuity that lined up with the 
stereotypes "thoroughly tested by news organizations in stories set in other 
African countries."296  
Fair and Parks explain that the "framing of news coverage of the Rwandan 
genocide as localized Hutu-Tutsi warfare made news reports simpler to produce 
and easier for U.S. television audiences to digest.”297  Likewise, they suggest, 
"reporters at the outset were unable to make clear distinctions as to which side 
was good or bad. This ambiguity caused the genocide story to receive far less 
coverage than subsequent movements of thousands of refugees into settlement 
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camps in 1995 and 1996."298  In The Media and the Rwandan Genocide, Allan 
Thompson reiterates this point:  
Most international news organizations initially misunderstood 
the nature of the killing in Rwanda, portraying it as the result of 
tribal warfare, rather than genocide. Much of the international 
coverage focused on the scramble to evacuate expatriates 
from the country.299  
An example of this misunderstanding was evident on April 8 when Tom Brokaw 
of NBC framed his report with a sweeping stereotype: "when it comes to turmoil 
and bloodshed, nothing compares to Central Africa."300 For NBC, “turmoil and 
bloodshed” was part of the normal Rwandan cosmology.    
Despite attempting to make stories coming out of Rwanda “simpler” and 
more appealing for their television audience by discussing the evacuation of 
Westerners, Fair and Parks suggest that, overall, “the Rwandan genocide was 
not a ‘good’ news story for many US news organizations."301 As I suggested in 
Chapter I, conflicts in Africa are rarely considered ‘good’ news stories, and the 
history of ‘race’ identification and stereotypes—like the ones employed by NBC 
on April 8—are one of the reasons why. “Race,” as Jo Ellen Fair explains, “is a 
central organizing principle of social relations in the United States, and because 
media organizations are powerful institutions connected to other powerful 
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political, social, and economic institutions, notions of race and of ‘blackness’ will 
inevitably make their way into news content.”302 Fair has examined the use of 
stereotypical imagery dedicated to "Africa" in American newsrooms, and one 
place that she can typically turn to in order to understand the unfortunate 
outcome of networks using embedded, condescending, and stereotypical 
discourse, is simply by asking her students: 
Each semester when I ask my students, the majority of 
whom are white and middle class, to describe for me their 
images and ideas of “Africa,” “Africans,” or particular 
countries on the African continent, I get the usual litany of 
stereotypical, negative, and often condescending 
descriptions. To my students, “Africa” is: “a basketcase,” 
“jungle-covered” “big game, safari,” “impoverished,” “falling 
apart,” “famine-plagued,” “full of war,” “AIDS-ridden,” “torn by 
apartheid,’· “weird,” “brutal,” “savage,” “primitive,” 
“backward,” “tribal,” “undeveloped,” and “black.” Moreover, 
my students describe ”Africans” as: “having AIDS,” ”lazy,” 
”crazy,” ”corrupt,” “troubled,” “underdeveloped,” “fight[ing] all 
the time,” “brutal,” “savage,” “exotic,” “sexually active,” 
“backward,” “tribal,” “primitive,” and again “black.”’303  
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This discourse, which draws a distinct difference between one's self and the 
Other subject of the binary, can also encourage the creation of "negative 
feelings," “aggression” and "hostility." Hall writes:  
Difference is ambivalent. It can be both positive and 
negative. It is both necessary for the production of meaning, 
the formation of language and culture, for social identities 
and a subjective sense of the self as a sexed subject--and at 
the same time, it is threatening, a site of danger, of negative 
feelings, of splitting, hostility and aggression towards the 
'Other'.304   
In April 1994, the dissociation that Hall suggests emerges from a "threatening" 
Other, was evident in the ambiguous language that the networks used to 
describe the genocide: "carnage," “chaos and anarchy,”305 and "tribal fighting” 
that had “plunged into ethnic slaughter.” 306 I will argue that this sort of discourse 
created a false ‘idea’ of Rwanda, resulting in the West further distancing itself 
from the small African country—especially when Westerners were affected. 
Hence the stories juxtaposing ‘African aggressors’ that ‘threatened’ the 
vulnerable westerners, which served as a point of identification and emphasized 
the violence as a function of racial differences. 
Hostility and “negative feelings” were established through a discourse of 
racialized difference that both invented and reinvented Africa for the West:   
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…the social and political constructs of “Africa” and “Africans” 
racially as “black,” along side a host of very unfavorable 
attributes, I find to be particularly revealing about the way in 
which “Africa” and “Africans” have been invented historically 
and reinvented contemporarily. “Fact” and “fiction” constantly 
reinforce each other in the construction of Africa and Africans 
as the undifferentiated “Other”.”307   
Allan Thompson suggests that the fictional “construction” of Africa played a 
significant role in American media because they were "misconstruing the killing in 
the first weeks as spontaneous, tribal warfare rather than a systematic campaign 
to exterminate a minority."308 Likewise, I feel that the discourse successfully 
created a further separation between the "Americans" and the "Africans" when, 
during the first week of the genocide, all of the news networks were focused on 
evacuation of Western foreigners from the "chaos" in Rwanda. For example, 
distancing was particularly evident on April 8 when CBS explained that the 
“horrified foreigners were rescued from the savagery of the ethnic warfare in 
Rwanda today,” escaping an “orgy of violence.”309 Using of the term “orgy of 
violence” three times in less than thirty seconds certainly catered to the myth that 
the “savages” were going to harm the innocent Westerners with random, 
indiscriminate violence – the precise opposite of a genocide, which is 
premeditated, organized, and targeted.  
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Amanda Grzyb argues that the Western media uses a racialized discourse 
to bolster stories about the safety of Westerners.  She writes:   
The western media’s tendency to depict “the African” as a 
racially inscribed other suggests that African-ness acts as a 
foil for western subjectivity (“savage” or “tribal” Africa vs. the 
“civilized” and “civilizing” west).  This representational logic 
creates layers of meaning that can sometimes be quite 
contradictory.  For example, during the Rwandan genocide, 
Hutu and Tutsi people were often constructed as inhabiting a 
single, interchangeable racialized identity: “warring” Africans 
whose violence was fueled by mysterious “ancient tribal 
hatreds,” “savages” who butchered one another 
indiscriminately and threatened the safety of western 
expatriates.310   
The construction of 'difference' by the America television networks outlined a 
distinct separation between 'us'—the Westerners—and ‘them'—the Rwandans—
by consistently implementing language that forced the people of Rwanda into a 
"single, interchangeable racialized identity." The discourse created a false reality 
driven by racial stereotypes masking the “real,” which is precisely what Fair also 
argues:  
 In reproducing the dominant or prevailing language and 
discourses, media organizations position individuals, objects, 	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and relations in a way that naturalizes the boundaries of 
discussion as the only ones possible or the only ones that 
are “real.”311  
Following Fair’s argument, the American networks described the genocide as the 
“ethnic ritual of slaughter and revenge”312 in an attempt to, in some way, 
“naturalize” the situation into something that often occurred. Such “naturalizing” 
discourse was also reiterated on April 15 on NBC with the emotional plea.313 
Despite what possible "reality" the viewer could take away from this exchange, 
NBC immediately counteracted any thoughts about the man’s deadly dilemma or 
Western remorse with a clip that instantly placed the focus back on the safety of 
Westerner expatriates. Juxtaposed with the Rwandan man's interview, the 
Belgian soldier was "relieved" to be leaving "behind a brutal conflict, with no end 
in sight"314 because, he said: "Frankly, the Rwandans are becoming crazy. They 
are becoming savages."315 Like the report that described the Rwandans as 
“animals,” this report both dehumanized and racialized the victims and 
perpetrators of the genocide indiscriminately.  Not only did the April 15 clip use 
provocative and racist language to separate the Rwandans from the 
‘domesticated’ Westerners, NBC also essentially numbed the viewer’s interest in 
any sort of intervention. That discourse came full circle when, on April 29, NBC’s 
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last story that month once again described the “crazy” Rwandans “becoming 
savages.”316  
April 11 was one of the most significant shifts in the coverage because the 
networks began to show Nick Hughes’ footage of the killing in the street. The 
video, which was originally assumed to be “three women…pleading for their 
lives” as they were “savagely beaten, then hacked to death by soldiers,”317 is an 
iconic image of the genocide. The video was captured by Nick Hughes, a British 
director/cameraman, from the top floor of a French school on the other side of a 
valley in central Kigali.318 After looking through the scope of a rocket launcher, 
which Hughes borrowed from one of the Belgian soldiers at the school, he 
relocated the people with his camera lens, and pressed record. The video 
footage had a number of jump cuts throughout because Hughes was attempting 
to conserve what little battery life he had left on his camera, but he was able to 
capture almost twenty minutes of footage that featured "two women among one 
pile of bodies" who were "slowly beaten to death, tortured."319 Hughes’ 
description reads: "Both women were kneeling. One was begging, arms 
outstretched. Nonchalantly, the killers would come over and beat the men who 
were dying in front of these women, then stroll away."320  Also, throughout the 
twenty-minute video, Hughes noticed that "no one questioned why these people 
were there, why they were doing this," and he later acknowledged, "people living 
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on the street could have stopped them. There is no attempt to escape and no 
possibility of escape.”321  He continues:  
Eventually, someone killed the two women with severe 
blows. I caught that on tape, one of the only instances, I 
believe, of an actual killing being recorded by the media. 
Looking back, it is surprising that given the number of bodies 
we saw around the city when we traveled with military 
convoys, we hadn’t witnessed the killing of more people. 
Nobody was going to kill in front of the camera if they knew it 
was recording. I suppose, in this instance, they didn't know 
they were being watched because we were across the 
valley.322 
In a 2009 Toronto Star article, Allan Thompson323 compared the impact of Nick 
Hughes’ video to the Vietnamese girl, Kim Phuc, running away from the napalm 
during the Vietnam War, the "Falling Man" of September 11, or the man defying 
the tanks in Tiananmen Square in 1989. However, despite the comparisons, 
Thompson feels that Hughes’ video had an important difference: 
But the images of the praying man and the woman who 
perished beside him on a dirt road in Rwanda are somehow 
different, more urgent, more haunting for what might have 
been.  	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The news footage of their deaths was captured in the first 
moments of a 100-day rampage, at the front end of the arc 
of a genocide that would overtake Rwanda in the months to 
come. If only we had understood what we were seeing – or 
cared enough to understand – Rwanda might have been 
different.  
As their deaths were broadcast around the world, their 
unidentified bodies were hurled into the back of a yellow 
truck and dumped into a mass grave, forgotten by the world 
that also forgot their country.324  
The lack of context and understanding is precisely the issue that many journalists 
and photographers face when capturing images of individuals during war, natural 
disasters, genocide or crimes against humanity. In fact, as one can see in the 
differing accounts between Nick Hughes and Allan Thompson, some of the 
information can change. Nick Hughes always thought that it was two women in 
the video, but, in fact, it was a man and a woman.325 April 11 was not the last 
time the images of the machete murder were seen on American television 
screens, but it certainly helped reinvigorate many of the myths that had come to 
be associated with Africa up until that point when Linda Vester said—over top of 
the grainy images—that the tribes seemed "bent on killing each other at every 
turn."326 Vester’s dialogue over top of the images of Hughes’ machete murder is 
also important to acknowledge, because instead of enabling the video to speak 	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for itself, Vester seemed to change the story. Specifically, her use of the words 
‘each other’ forced the viewer to read the people in the video not as an individual 
‘victim’ or ‘perpetrator,’ because they were lumped together with ‘each other’ into 
one specific ‘nameless,’ ‘faceless,’ and ‘genderless,’ identifier that catered to the 
typical African myths of “tribal fighting” that are presumed to be inevitable, 
unpredictable and “at every turn.” There was a disconnection between what the 
American news broadcasters were actually witnessing—a terrorized populace of 
Tutsi and moderate Hutu being killed—and the narrative that implied an equality 
between victims and perpetrators. 
Presenting images of ‘nameless,’ ‘faceless,’ ‘genderless,’ ‘Africans’ has 
become a convention for many in the media industry, and it certainly aids a 
viewer's disassociation from the ‘people’ that have become ‘objects’ on the 
television screen. In "If I Look at the Mass, I Will Never Act," Paul Slovic argues 
that viewing images of suffering, genocide and mass murder in large quantities 
also numb the viewer’s ability to really care: "the numbers fail to spark emotion or 
feeling and thus fail to motivate action. Genocide in Darfur is real, but we do not 
"feel" that reality."327 Susan Sontag makes a similar observation when she 
discusses the role of photography, and the way in which one is not able to 
consume the "reality" through the visual medium of the photograph. For example, 
as Sontag explains, "a photograph that brings news of some unsuspected zone 
of misery cannot make a dent in public opinion unless there is an appropriate 
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context of feeling and attitude."328 Aligning further with Slovic in a discussion on 
affect and photography, Sontag suggests that, "photographs shock in so far as 
they show something novel…one's first encounter with the photographic 
inventory of ultimate horror is a kind of revelation, the prototypically modern 
revelation: a negative epiphany."329 Essentially, the negative epiphany is 
disempowered because we often focus of the generalized myth that violence, 
tribal war and brutality is directly associated with ‘Africa’, and that removes a 
sense of shock. For instance, like the racist discourse used by the American 
television networks in April 1994, images also had the ability to alter the truth of 
an event and make it "less real": 
Once one has seen such images, one has started down the 
road of seeing more—and more… An event known through 
photographs certainly becomes more real than it would have 
been if one had never seen the photographs—think of the 
Vietnam War.... But after repeated exposure to images an 
event also becomes less real.330 
The images captured by Nick Hughes failed to build viewer empathy because the 
video was always shown in conjunction with discourse of race-based stereotypes 
and other images that conflated other ‘African’ myths. For example, I found that 
the American television networks continued to show Hughes’ video on a number 
of occasions—April 11th, 18th and 25th—juxtaposed with the same images of the 
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same pile of dead bodies in the middle of the street.331 Images can fail to provide 
the viewer with an "appropriate context of feeling and attitude,”332 which was 
certainly the case when CBS prefaced a story with Hughes’ video with a 
warning.333 The warnings that CBS and ABC started using on April 25 and 28 as 
an introduction to the "graphic" images established an ironic twist when the 
broadcaster explained that they “do tell the story," because in no way did the 
images really ‘tell’ the ‘true’ story. The warnings also created an atmosphere of 
racialized difference between the Rwandans and Americans on April 28 when 
CBS explained that, “in Rwanda, history is being written in blood…like the month-
long Rwandan civil war itself, the pictures in this report are both gruesome and 
graphic.”334 These warnings appear, from a distance, to bring a sense of ‘reality’ 
to the viewer, but attempting to do so in a myth laden environment, as Sontag 
and Slovic outlined, is impossible. ABC and CBS may have warned their viewers 
about the unsettling images, but the emotional charge of these images were 
disrupted by the racist discourse that had been attached to them for the month 
prior.  
Repetitive presentations of dead bodies laying on the road in large piles, 
and dialogue that described the genocide as “tribal warfare” catered to the typical 
‘African’ myths and distanced the western viewers from something that was 
apparently inevitable. That phenomenon also occurred because, trapped within 
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the basic structure of semiotics, captive images can only carry with them the 
meaning that society constructs:   
 Though an event has come to mean, precisely, something 
worth photographing, it is still ideology (in the broadest 
sense) that determines what constitutes an event. There can 
be no evidence, photographic or otherwise, of an event until 
the event itself has been named and characterized.335  
As the same video clips and images continued to inundate viewers with the same 
stereotypes—made possible by the “specialized tourists known as journalists”336 
providing the “living room sights and sounds”337 —I would argue that Western 
viewers were forced to try to ‘witness’ something that had been “named and 
characterized” as a ‘ritual’ ‘tribal slaughter’ and not as a genocide.  An image’s 
ability to keep its “emotional charge” is very important because, as Sontag 
explains, "the ethical content of photographs is fragile. With the possible 
exception of photographs of those horrors, like the Nazi camps, but again the 
status of ethical reference point, most photographs do not keep their emotional 
charge."338  
ABC and NBC lost the “emotional charge” in images broadcast on April 13 
showing Rwandan mental health patients being left behind as the Belgian 
paratroopers rescued all of the Westerners. The images are very difficult to look 
at when one understands the real context of what was happening, but on April 
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13, 1994, the images were mitigated by a discourse that described these people 
as ‘crazy’ ‘tribal’ ‘savages’ (not to mention the fact that there already are/were 
horrific stereotypes in North America pertaining to mental health facilities). The 
images only developed through the context of how viewers understood the 
content of the image. Therefore, I would argue that the footage of the 200 
patients surrendering to the Western ‘rescue team’ falls directly within the logic of 
binary opposition used throughout the month of April to spatially separate the 
‘crazy’ ‘tribal’ ‘savages’ from the Westerners.  
For the American television broadcasters, the importance of spatially 
separating the West from ‘them’ was also revealed in NBC’s narration that 
immediately followed the story about the mental health facility on April 13, 1994: 
“back in this country.” Discourse like “back in this country” can have a tragic 
effect on the subject because it leaves the “Other” “spatially incarcerated”: 
In writing Africa in oppositional terms (“here/there,” 
“we/they”, “ours/ theirs’), difference becomes spatialized, 
with the “object” of “our” study or reportage placed “over 
there.” It is at that moment when the object is “spatially 
incarcerated” as the “Other” that any opportunity for relations 
based upon dialogue rather than domination ends. Spatially 
separating countries, cultures, or peoples allows difference 
to remain unproblematized as merely “us” and “them” (or 
perhaps even “us” versus “them”).”339   
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In fact, on numerous occasions—April 13 being one of them—Tom Brokaw used 
the Othering discourse of “back in this country" and "back at home now" to segue 
into his next story, which certainly separated what was happening in Rwanda and 
“Central Africa” from ‘us’ in the West.  
 
When is it ‘genocide’? 
 As Adam Jones explains, "until the second world war, genocide was a 
"crime with no name.""340 Since Raphael Lemkin implemented the campaign to 
persuade the United Nations to create a convention on genocide in the aftermath 
of the Holocaust, the power of the word “genocide” encouraged – some would 
even say, obligated – international response. After April 15, 1994, all of the 
American television networks began to scale back the coverage on Rwanda; 
however, closer to the end of the month, the stories coming from the American 
broadcasters began to shift. Despite the fact The New York Times ran an 
editorial about the UN withdrawal from Rwanda on April 23 in which it refers to 
the massacres as “genocide,” or some journalists – like the BBC’s Mark Doyle – 
and some international NGOs had been describing Rwanda as ‘genocide’ for a 
good portion of April, it was not until April 25 when the words ‘civil war’ and ‘tribal 
warfare’ were finally replaced on CBS for a brief moment by the word 
‘genocide’.341 A similar shift in discourse happened on ABC on April 28, 1994,342 
but the most significant part in the April 28 report came with the United States 	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State Department’s desperate avoidance of the word “genocide” because they 
knew the term had to signal an obligation to intervene.343 The sense of 
“confusion” and “chaos” about whether or not there was an actual genocide 
occurring in Rwanda was certainly plastered all over the screens during the press 
conference. In fact, the “confusion” was presented once again as ABC followed 
up the State Department interview with Roger Winter, the then US Director for 
the Committee on Refugees, who explained that it was “really appropriate to use 
the word genocide.” CBS also reiterated the need for intervention on April 30, 
1994—the last clip of April from American television news;344 however, they also 
acknowledged that those ‘words’ and ‘images’ on the screen were not 
encouraging very much motivation for humanitarian intervention because the 
U.S. was “more than resistant to risk any lives in a country where ethnic warfare 
is only likely to escalate.345 
Today, there are still lingering questions about why the media or 
international politicians waited so long to declare that what happened in Rwanda 
was a genocide when there was a vast amount of evidence to show that Hutu 
extremists were, indeed, committing genocide against Tutsi civilians. As Linda 
Melvern explains, "there were ample grounds to prove that the genocide 
convention had been violated between 6 April and 15 July,” but the UN patiently 
took the action of creating a committee of experts to "evaluate the evidence."346 
The evidence from the UN committee of experts was not officially available until 	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October of 1994—three and a half months after the genocide had finished. At 
that point, they concluded that, "although both sides of the armed conflict had 
perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes 
against humanity, there existed a mass of evidence that the extermination of the 
Tutsi and moderate Hutus had been planned months in advance."347 In April 
1994, the Clinton administration avoided using the term associated with Rwanda 
on every possible occasion because it provided "some cover against critics of the 
US government's nonintervention."348 It was not until 1998 that Bill Clinton finally 
used the word genocide, and it was a rhetorical reversal that was an important 
step to admitting the failure of the international community: "We did not 
immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide."349 Not only was 
the 1998 reversal an important reminder for the unwillingness of many Western 
governments to intervene in Rwanda, it was also a reminder for those in the 
media industry that words can be extremely powerful. 
 
Conclusion 
From April 6, 1994, to April 30, 1994, American television news 
broadcasters presented viewers with stories about the Rwandan genocide driven 
by stereotypical racist discourse, inappropriate comparisons to Somalia and a 
general misunderstanding of what was actually happening to the people of 
Rwanda. ABC, CBS, and NBC failed to identify the massacres in Rwanda as 	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genocide, and consistently misrepresented what was happening to the Tutsi and 
the moderate Hutu. In addition, for an entire month, Rwanda was the least 
reported continuing international issue to reach viewers in the West, which is 
difficult to fathom for many genocide scholars because they consistently argue 
that the "media content can indeed have an effect on policy."350 As I will present 
in the Chapter III, the same stereotypical discourse and conventions television 
news used to produce stories in ‘Africa’ continued throughout the summer of 
1994; however, the coverage concluded with a television news frenzy about the 
‘good news’ story of a humanitarian crisis, and ends with an epiphany that 
acknowledges their failure.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
May 1, 1994 – July 18, 1994 
 
In this chapter, I examine American television news coverage of the 
Rwandan genocide between May 1 and July 18 1994. Like the network coverage 
during the month of April, Richard Dowden suggests that subsequent television 
reports about the genocide also “reinforced the impression that what was going 
on there was an inevitable and primitive process that had no rational explanation 
and could not be stopped by negotiation or force.”351 From May until the end of 
July, ABC, CBS and NBC continued to provide inaccurate coverage of the 
massacres, while they were also engaged by the emerging story of a Rwandan 
refugee crisis. In May, the hundreds of thousands of refugees that fled the 
country established a distracting narrative thread that described the movement of 
refugees from Rwanda to countries like Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania. As they 
reported from the refugee receiving states, not Rwanda, these stories garnered 
far more attention from the networks than the confused stories of civilian 
massacres. As Livingston suggests, the American television broadcast networks 
“devoted relatively little attention to the systematic extermination” of the Tutsi, 
because, instead, they were “centered on the hundreds of thousands of Hutu 
refugees”352 leaving the country and creating a new humanitarian crisis. 
However, the movement of the refugees into the camps in Zaire was not the only 
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distraction for the American networks, because they were also infatuated with the 
O.J. Simpson trial.353  
However, mixed in with the confusion of the refugee crisis, and the 
attention paid to O.J., was an increasingly dehumanizing discourse (and 
accompanying images) that suggested that those Rwandans still in the country, 
and the mass exodus of people were still a ‘natural,’ inevitable occurrence. This 
inaccuracy surfaced because, as Fair suggests, “following refugees was easier 
than reporting about mass murder” and “refugees made good visuals because 
they evoked the now familiar images of famine and conflict in Africa.”354 
Information about the refugee crisis was more accessible because journalists 
could rely on aid agencies to help them tell the story. The news about the 
refugees was not, however, without confusion. Fair suggests that stories 
broadcast on ABC, CBS and NBC, “were unable to make clear distinctions as to 
which side was good or bad”355—the ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’—from the 
beginning. Near the end of the genocide, as I demonstrate below, the news 
agencies did eventually understand the nuances of the identities of the fleeing 
Rwandan refugees, and began to suggest that some Hutu refugees were afraid 
that the RPF would seek revenge for the genocide. Fair claims that the 
misinformation and ambiguities “caused the genocide story to receive far less 
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coverage than subsequent movements of thousands of refugees into settlement 
camps.”356  
  From May 1 to July 18, the American television news broadcasters 
presented “tribal” stereotypes and perpetuated the myth that the genocide was 
civil war; however, they were also drawn to the emerging story about the fleeing 
refugees. The refugee coverage often included stereotypes associated with the 
typical “African humanitarian crisis” and obscured the ways in which the refugee 
crisis was directly tied to the massacres. It was not until the end of July when 
some network journalists on the ground began to break down the myths and 
inaccuracies and changed the discourse. But by then, that was simply too little, 
too late.   
 
The Coverage 
On May 1 and 2, ABC357, CBS and NBC maintained the status quo from 
the month of April, describing Rwanda as an “orgy of violence”, “civil war”, 
“bloodbath”358, “savage civil war”, “orgy of murder” “cataclysmic explosion of 
ethnic cleansing”, “ethnic slaughter and hatred”359 and a “murderous civil war in 
Rwanda.”360 On May 5, NBC ended their broadcast with another report about the 
fate of the mountain gorillas in Rwanda. Like the ABC story on April 13, NBC, on 
May 5, mentioned Diane Fosse and Gorillas in the Mist, and reported that “so far 	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there have been no reports of any gorillas hurt, but many of the scientists and 
researchers who watch over the animals have had to escape for their own 
personal safety.”361 They also reported that news of the cease-fire had not 
reached the troops in “the killing fields”362 in Rwanda. 
One of the first examples of a ‘genocide’ epiphany was presented by Ron 
Allen of ABC on May 7 when he explained that there was more evidence that the 
“civil war” was in fact a “premeditated political act not a spontaneous ethnic 
hatred”363 taken on by Rwanda's government, extremist Hutus, looking for more 
power. Allen also explained that human rights investigators “see a pattern.”364 On 
the same day that Allen suggested that the genocide was not a “civil war” or 
“spontaneous ethnic hatred,” NBC and CBS still reported that a “civil war”365 
continued in Rwanda. However, days later, on May 9, CBS and Connie Chung 
explained that the “bloodbath” in Rwanda was approaching a “climax” that 
evening, but likely not a “conclusion.” Rwanda was leaving behind a “legacy of 
genocide” which was the worst, Chung explained, since the killing fields in 
Cambodia.  While it appeared that CBS was finally making a significant transition 
from describing the massacres as civil war to describing them as genocide, on 
May 13, they reverted to the standard description of a “nightmarish bloodbath in 
Rwanda.”  The following day, ABC suggested that “at least half 1 million people 
have been killed during Rwanda's 5 weeks of civil war.” Likewise, on May 16, 
Tom Brokaw explained that the US was “flying in a hundred tons of relief going 	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into Rwanda almost daily,” and then segued into the next story with “a couple of 
notes on people now”—to discuss a court case somewhere in America. The 
juxtaposition of such a significant statement is certainly telling, especially in May. 
A month after the genocide began, the mass murder of an enormous group of 
targeted ‘people’ was still not considered to be part of “a couple of notes on 
people,” which is almost unbelievable.  
On June 17, 1994, American television broadcasters devoted almost all of 
their attention to O.J. Simpson, and experienced a form of ‘genocide amnesia’ as 
Simpson’s white Ford Bronco attempted to elude police. The very next day, on 
June 18, the French initiated Operation Turquoise, which was a heavily criticized 
mission because of the role that the French once had in the training of the 
presidential guards and supplying the Interahamwe with weapons.366 However, 
because of the continued media infatuation with O.J. Simpson, the revelation that 
there was genocide, not civil war, in Rwanda and that the French were sending in 
troops to confront it, did not reappear on the US evening news until June 23, 
when CBS reported that French troops were in Rwanda “trying to intervene in a 
war of genocide.”367 They followed with two interviews that questioned France's 
role in the possible genocide. The first interview was with Roger Winter, from the 
US Committee for Refugees, who outlined why there is a mistrust of the French: 
“The role of the French in Rwanda has not been a positive one for the last 3 1/2 
years. They have basically supported the people who committed the genocide 
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politically, militarily, and diplomatically.”368 Similarly, Mike Dottridge, from 
Amnesty International, suggested, “if the French Army was involved in any way in 
facilitating that dirty war, which eventually became the massacres of genocide 
that we've seen in the last 2 1/2 months, that is very serious.”369 Unfortunately, 
instead of providing some historical context to both of the interviews, Connie 
Chung followed that story with an unscientific “CBS news poll” asking if Rwanda 
was “important to the interests” of the United States and the responsibility of the 
US to intervene in the genocide.  Chung stated:   
According to a CBS news poll, most Americans feel that United 
States has no responsibility to stop the killing in Rwanda. Asked 
specifically if the US should send ground troops, 61% said no. 
Only 15% said that what happens in Rwanda is very important to 
the interests of the United States. By contrast, 59% said that 
what happens in North Korea is very important to US interests.370 
Chung immediately followed that segment with a story on North Korean and 
American talks, which reinforced the findings of the poll.371 The fact that on the 
very next day, June 24, CBS suggested that the French had moved into Rwanda 
to protect civilians from “tribal slaughter”372 potentially reveals that CBS had very 
little interest in acknowledging the reality of the genocide, and a recurring case of  
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‘genocide amnesia’ helped CBS ignore the same “massacres of genocide”373 that 
they had openly acknowledged the day before.  
On June 26, NBC covered Rwanda with a story about the African 
Conference in Washington, which was focusing on “how America [could] lift 
pessimism into constructive plans for Rwandans and all of Africa.”374 In an 
interview, US National Security Adviser, Tony Lake, suggested, “Rwanda should 
galvanize American concern for Africa” because it is “a story of ethnic hatred 
transformed into genocide.”375  NBC’s acknowledgment of genocide on June 26 
was followed with the suggestion that South Africa and its free election was “the 
only major success story on the continent.”376  
On July 4, NBC explained that, after three months of “civil war,”377 “the 
rebels” in the “killing field” captured Kigali.378 Likewise, CBS said that the “civil 
war”379 was “taking another turn tonight” as the “rebel forces” had the “most 
significant gain yet”380 by capturing Kigali. However, unlike NBC and CBS, on 
July 4, ABC ran a report that acknowledged the genocide in Catherine Crier’s 
informed story about a group of Tutsi children. Crier suggested, “these Tutsi 
children have survived Rwanda's genocide, but their scars are indelible, crippling 
and deep”381 and “everywhere there are stories of horrific ordeals.” The report 
included rather graphic (perhaps even voyeuristic) images of children with 
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missing legs and Crier finishing her story by explaining that the camp they just 
showed in Nyanza is no longer safe and “everyone must leave.”382  
 On July 14, CBS explained, “Following the bloodbath of civil war, now 
comes a tide of human misery,” referencing “Rwanda’s greatest and final wave of 
refugees.”383  Remarkably, just four days before the genocide ended, CBS was 
still reverting to the language of “bloodbath” and “civil war” to describe the 
genocide.  Immediately following this report, CBS interviewed Geoffrey Dennis 
from the British Red Cross, who rightly acknowledged the reality of how the 
media could potentially have a positive impact on such a massive crisis: “The 
danger is, as it happened in Somalia, once this moves away from the headlines, 
there won’t be money coming in.”384 Setting a precedent for the other media 
institutions, CBS acknowledged and made public the potential role of the 
media—something that was never acknowledged at any other time during the 
course of the genocide. Remarkably, on that very same day, they used the same 
misleading, inaccurate, stereotypical language that had plagued the genocide 
from the beginning.   
 On July 15, just three days before the genocide was over, ABC finally 
provided nuance about the refugee crisis, acknowledging that the refugees 
leaving Rwanda were “Hutus fleeing the Tutsi rebel army.”385 It was the first time 
any of the three networks had made such a distinction. Likewise, on the same 
day, CBS discussed the United States decision to break diplomatic relations with 
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Rwanda because “President Clinton accused the Hutu government there of 
supporting the massacre of minority Tutsis.”386   
On July 16, 1994, ABC reported that Brian Atwood, head of the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, would assess the “relief efforts for the 
victims of Rwanda's bloody civil war.” While the report did call the genocide a 
“civil war,” it also made an important distinction about victims and perpetrators. 
As part of the piece, Ron Allen included an interview with a Rwandan refugee, 
who said he was running from the country because he heard on a radio 
broadcast that “Hutus like him were being exterminated by the advancing Tutsi 
rebel army.”387 Allen followed the interview by clarifying:  “there is no evidence of 
civilian killings by the rebels, but the people believe that the propaganda is 
true.”388 Then Allen went on to explain that the government soldiers who “did 
carry out the massacres” also led the refugee march into the Zaire. Allen’s tone 
and understanding of the context during the July 16 story was significant 
because he appropriately identified the victims and the perpetrators of the 
genocide.  
 On the same day that ABC was the first network to clearly identify the 
victims and perpetrators of the massacres, CBS ran a similarly groundbreaking 
story that described the weapons used by the perpetrators. After referring to  
“Rwanda’s civil war,”389CBS described the “instruments of genocide,”390 
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Sky News showing groups of Hutu soldiers, whom he called “the one-time 
butchers of Rwanda in a bloodstained retreat.” Again, there was finally an 
emphasis on the identity of the perpetrators, and an acknowledgment that the 
massacres were one-sided, state-sponsored, and genocidal. On July 16, CBS 
also ran a very significant dialogue between Mark Phillips and Bob Schieffer in 
which Phillips stressed that it is important “to remember the context in which this 
happened:”391  
Bob Schieffer: Do you think that there is any way that this could have 
been avoided? 
 
Mark Phillips: In hindsight, it's difficult to say, but clearly at the time 
there was nothing that any outside government could have, or perhaps 
would have, more to the point, have done to rectify the situation. You 
have to remember the context in which this happened. This is a small 
country far away that not many people have heard of with an almost 
indefatigable internal crisis. Also, for the Rwandese, it had a very 
unlucky happenstance of coming right after the international 
experience in Somalia, and for that matter, the experience in Bosnia. 
Both situations where international efforts were not used to great 
effect, so bad luck for them. It's really tough to say in hindsight what 
could have done, what could have changed things.  
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Schieffer: Seeing these extraordinary pictures tonight, which is so 
overwhelming, it is easy to forget that this is only a part of it, because 
before this exodus happened, at least 200,000 perhaps a half-million 
people were killed in this fighting. I think another unusual thing, Mark, 
it is very difficult in this to figure out who the good guys and the bad 
guys are. Is there a way to separate that out? 
 
Phillips: Well, no. It's also important to look at this back beyond the 2 
or 3 months of this particular chapter in this conflict has been 
underway with these pictures that we have been seeing on TV. This is 
a conflict that goes back decades and even centuries. This is rooted 
deep in ethnic animosity and deep social conflicts between haves and 
have-nots in that part of Africa. The people now in the RPF that are 
moving with such efficiency through the country and forcing this 
evacuation ahead of them…are the sons and daughters of people who 
themselves were forced to flee Rwanda during an earlier Hutu uprising 
a couple of decades ago. This is a big wheel of misfortune that just 
keeps on turning and turning and you have to look at it in that context. 
 
Shieffer: The question of course is whether this is too little and too late 
and that we're going to have to see over the next weeks. 
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Phillips’ consistent reiteration that it was imperative for one “to look at it in that 
context,” presented CBS with a new opportunity to frame the genocide in 
Rwanda as a real genocide instead of the “civil war” they alluded to at the very 
beginning of the broadcast on July 16.  
On July 18, CBS announced that “the antigovernment forces declared 
victory,” and the conflict in Rwanda was over. Mark Phillips also interviewed 
Alison Des Forges, from Human Rights Watch, who outlined the “fatalistic” 
problems on the television screen of an institution run by the “people on the 
outside” who believe “that the kind of feeling that is going on now has always 
gone on”:  
People on the outside have a very fatalistic approach to conflict 
in Africa. They tend to believe that there has been no change on 
the African continent and that the kind of killing that is going on 
now has always gone on and will always go on, so why 
bother?392   
As Phillips deconstructed stereotypes about the “African continent” and the 
things that apparently “always go on” there, he highlighted the stance that the 
Western governments took when it came to Rwanda, which was driven by the 
stereotypes associated with Africa and Somalia.  He said, “the cynical fact is that 
the Rwandese picked the wrong time to start killing each other again—a time 
when Western governments, after the experience in Somalia and Bosnia, had 
grown tired of trying to solve other people's problems, especially in places where 
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they had no economic or strategic interests.”393 Like the “economic or strategic 
interests” that the Western governments acknowledged in the response to the 
genocide, CBS should have been well aware that the same “interests” were more 
than likely noted when the media institutions’ executives were deciding which 
stories would benefit them “economically” or “strategically.”  This position was 
also reiterated during a subsequent interview with Roger Winter from the U.S. 
Committee for Refugees, who explained that Rwanda is: “a poor country, it's 
unimportant to most of the world. There's no economic interests there, there's no 
political interest there, there's no oil, there's no money to be made.” Phillips 
concluded the story with a hypothetical situation that ‘hits home’ for the Western 
viewers: “If the Rwandese were fleeing to Florida instead of Zaire, the reaction 
might be different.  But this horror, however terrible, is in a little place few had 
ever heard of and far away.”394  Phillips’ report marks the first time that any of the 
American television networks explicitly dealt with the politics of humanitarian 
intervention suggesting that people in a remote part of Africa were not 
considered valuable to the United States and the international community.   
Phillips’ report on CBS also attempted to give the Rwanda story some 
retrospective context, especially after the lead anchor, Paula Zahn, claimed that 
the “the slaughter in Rwanda is only the latest chapter in an age-old tribal 
conflict” and that there was “a power struggle between the minority Tutsis, who 
ruled the land for centuries, and the majority Hutus. As correspondent Mark 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 “CBS EVENING NEWS,” July 18, 1994. 
394 “CBS EVENING NEWS,” July 18, 1994.  
	   	    
	  93	  
Phillips reports, the latest chapter has been the bloodiest of all.”395 Philips then 
continued suggesting more of the appropriate and accurate information: 
When the scenes of horror from Rwanda began to literally pile up 
on the world’s TV screens, the reaction was one of shock and 
surprise. It shouldn't have been. The outside world may not have 
directly caused the Rwanda catastrophe, but it did contribute to 
it, and it certainly had evidence that it was coming. International 
relief agencies have been warning for years about the training of 
political and ethnic murder squads and the people who wrote 
those reports have their theories on why no one cared.396 
This point was also highlighted on ABC, on July 18, shortly after Peter Jennings 
said: “We begin tonight with Rwanda. Can it get any worse? Yes it can.”397 
Uncharacteristically, ABC started their evening broadcast with a story explaining 
that the Rwandan “antigovernment forces declared victory today” but that a 
“human catastrophe is now imminent.”398 The story included a claim by the 
reporter, John McWethy, who – like CBS – suggested that the American 
government was not interested in intervention: “When the idea of sending US 
medical teams or water specialists to Rwanda is raised, the Clinton 
administration says no. The White House wants no repeat of the disaster in 
Somalia, so the US will fly supplies to the region, but get no more deeply 
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involved.”399 While Somalia had been referenced since April 6, on the last day of 
the genocide, ABC included commentary by Roger Winter, who stressed that the 
genocide in Rwanda was definitely not “yet another African bloodletting.”400He 
said, “this situation cannot be allowed to be viewed as yet another African 
bloodletting, but it was genocide in perhaps the purest construct of genocide that 
we've had since the Holocaust.”401 Roger Winter’s comparison between Rwanda 
and The Holocaust was a pivotal moment because, only a few days prior, the 
genocide was still consistently referenced as ‘tribal warfare’. On July 18, the 
American television news broadcasters realized that, what was consistently 
referenced as some type of chaotic random killing, was actually an unimaginable 
genocide comparable to the Holocaust and they had been ignoring it.    
 
The ‘natural’ stereotypes, and the ‘good’ news story 
BBC journalist, George Alagiah, suggests that stereotypes contribute to 
“the way that African stories are so frequently framed.”402 American television 
broadcasters exposed Rwanda as a product of tribal warfare and were often 
unaware of the basic history or politics. Likewise, ambiguities and inaccuracies 
also affected the way in which the refugees were viewed by the American 
broadcasters between May and July, and the refugee story often distracted the 
networks from the genocide. US television news broadcasts from African nations 
have often been, as Suzanne Franks suggests, “reduced to a series of 	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journalistic stereotypes.”403 Additionally, Franks outlines that African stories are 
viewed as “a location for inexplicable ethnic wars and assorted disasters or 
celebrity visits”404 and follow a typical template. As I encountered in my research, 
the American networks stuck to a typical ‘grim template’ and described the 
swarms of people fleeing Rwanda as tragic and ‘helpless’ ‘victims’, while failing 
to recognize the complexity of the genocide still underway during the exodus.  As 
the RPF began to close in on government militia and the perpetrators of the 
genocide, the Hutu fled the country because they feared that the RPF would 
revenge the genocide of the Tutsi. My research shows that the American 
television broadcasters were often oblivious to the origins of the refugees, and 
unaware that some were genocide perpetrators and members of the 
Interahamwe militia. Instead, the television broadcasters simply placed them 
within the stereotypical template as the ‘victims’ of the ‘civil war’. As Franks 
suggests, misunderstanding the background and presenting misleading reports 
was yet another tragic flaw:  
The ignorance of what had happened in Rwanda was 
compounded weeks later when the Interahamwe Hutu killers 
arrived in the camps in eastern Zaire. By then the elections were 
over in South Africa so there was an unseemly rush by both 
journalists and aid agencies to places like Goma to tell terrible 
tales about poor refugees and their suffering. For days there 
were misleading reports where many of the journalists, who knew 	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little about the background, missed the point that the camps were 
not ministering to fleeing victims of the slaughter, but full of the 
recent killers and their relatives.405 
As the Hutu fled Rwanda because of fears that the RPF would retaliate, news 
media broadcasters consistently presented misleading reports.  It was not until 
July 15 – three days before the genocide ended – when ABC first acknowledged 
that many of the refugees leaving Rwanda were “Hutus fleeing the Tutsi rebel 
army.”406  
Inaccurate reports from the first days of the genocide to the origins of the 
refugee crisis show that the networks had “no coherent explanation of events 
happening in and around Rwanda.”407  The lack of a “coherent explanation” 
meant that the west ignored Rwandan civilian suffering, and the news media kept 
the US public “distant and safe.” As Niranian Karnik suggests, if news 
organizations presented accurate and reliable information, the public could take 
“the relevant information” and, in turn, “affect governments, institutions, locales, 
and other people.”408  Instead, the U.S. public was “kept distant and safe from 
any actual conflict, and from the complications of explanation.”409 The constant 
misinformation about the genocide and the refugees made the typical network 
news viewer “an unwitting participant in the production of knowledge about who 
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should live or die in lands far off from the United States.”410 If the viewers were 
never aware of the reality behind the Hutu refugees leaving Rwanda on their 
television screens, they were completely unable to understand the context, which 
also left them unable to provoke change. Essentially, the American television 
broadcasters failed to effectively provide their viewers with the truth to fuel their 
apathy, and, as Philips rightly suggested on July 18, “if the Rwandese were 
fleeing to Florida instead of Zaire, the reaction might be different.  But this horror, 
however terrible, is in a little place few had ever heard of and far away.”411 
However, as Karnik suggests, it can be difficult to be critical of coverage of 
crises on the magnitude of the Rwandan genocide because “many defenders of 
the media may claim (perhaps somewhat correctly) that it is a small miracle and 
a testament to the reporters of the various news agencies who place themselves 
in these difficult circumstances that enable people around the world to witness 
first-hand the violence and horror that exists in our modern world.”412 
Nevertheless, it is still important for the television broadcasters to understand 
that “difficult circumstances” and “safety” do not condone the production of 
stereotypes or conditions that mask truth, particularly when it comes to genocide 
and crimes against humanity. The first week of May repeated the stereotypical 
language of the April coverage, implying, as Wall suggests, “that the violence 
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was caused by something innate within the Rwandan people who are likely to 
burst into savage slaughter at any time.”413  She writes:  
Instead of supplying readers with full, explanatory portraits of 
Africa, news organizations have tended to stick with the easy 
stereotype, the image that can be easily absorbed by readers, 
however false it may be. The coverage of the Rwanda crisis 
proved no exception to the negative, shallow coverage of the 
past.414 
On May 16, the “shallow coverage” that Wall describes was evident when Tom 
Brokaw segued out of a story on Rwanda to “a couple of notes on people 
now.”415 Such distinctive divisions that the television broadcasters highlighted 
between “us”—the Americans—and “them”—the Rwandans, was present, even 
in small ways, throughout most of the broadcasts. On May 16, Brokaw and NBC 
juxtaposed the image of “people” beside the “Rwandans” and successfully 
maintained the stereotypes of difference, which they also exposed on May 5 by 
drawing a comparison between the Rwandans and gorillas. 
 In some ways, Brokaw’s suggestion that the Rwandans were not 
necessarily “people” was not something new, but par for the course. In April, the 
media compared Rwandans to the “gorillas in the mist”416and interviewed 
soldiers who described them—the Rwandans—as “worse than animals,”417 and 
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the coverage between May and July produced similar accounts. When, on May 
5, NBC ended their broadcast with another report about the plight of the 
mountain gorillas, the juxtaposition placed the importance of the gorillas, which 
had not been reported to be hurt, above the hundreds of thousands of Rwandans 
who had been killed by that point.  
In fact, Karnik suggests that even prior to 1994, the American media 
introduced the “default” Rwanda gorilla story. In 1992, during the civil war, the 
first casualty to come out of Rwanda was not a human being; it was a silverback 
gorilla named Mrithi. Like the April 11 and May 5 stories, the 1992 story created a 
type of “pop-psychology journalism,” which occurs when “the miniscule is made 
large and the significant made small.”418 With this example, Karnik does 
acknowledge that it is important not to “minimize the fact that a great animal and 
endangered species was killed needlessly.”419 However, when the “miniscule” 
story eclipses the ‘significant,’ journalists have committed a basic injustice. The 
gorilla comparisons on ABC on April 11 and NBC on May 5, demonstrate how 
“the story obscures many others.”420  
In addition to the gorilla references, I found dehumanizing language 
comparing fleeing refugees to animals during the mass exodus into Zaire.  For 
example, the refugees were described as “a mad stampede” of refugees or as a 
“human swarm,””421 which essentially suggested, in Wall’s words, “they are not 
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rational, fully evolved human beings, but something less.”422 Ultimately, the 
practice of using animal metaphors to describe Rwandans “dehumanizes the 
refugees, and can make it difficult for American media consumers to summon 
much sympathy.”423 A lack of sympathy was clearly evident during CBS’ June 24 
poll, when, CBS suggested, “most Americans feel that United States has no 
responsibility to stop the killing in Rwanda,” but “what happens in North Korea is 
very important to the US interests.” 424 The repetitive nature of the stereotypes 
and misinformation coming from the American media—including such unscientific 
polls—simply continued to highlight the ignorance and apathy. 
Another form of dehumanization through comparisons to “animals” or the 
“natural” environment was exposed when the American television broadcasters 
covered the refugees’ departure from Rwanda. Such representations, as Wall 
acknowledges, fit within a “framework that consistently presented them as either 
pathetic and helpless victims, or as insensate, animal-like creatures, or as 
barbaric savages.”425 In the same way that the discourse at the beginning of April 
followed the western stereotypes “that conflates them with the “dark continent,” a 
place of ongoing “tribal warfare,””426 language associated with the “waves”427 of 
refugees from May until July not only further dehumanized the Rwandans into a 
“natural” “inevitable” event, it also added to the general misinformation and “did 
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little to help”428 encourage interest from the international community. Suggesting 
that the refugee movement was a “natural occurrence” communicated that the 
“movements of people—like floods or other natural events—cannot be stopped 
by human intervention.”429 Likewise, the negative outcome of using the “natural” 
metaphors to describe the refugee situation simply suggested that it was a 
“natural occurrences in this region of the world.” Wall writes: 
Another means of dehumanizing the Rwandans is to describe the 
movement of great numbers of people so as to suggest that they 
are natural occurrences in this region of the world. This 
naturalness is particularly suggested by metaphors which 
compare the refugees exodus to movements of water.430  
Such dehumanizing and “naturalizing” metaphors were dominant closer to the 
end of July, when many of the media institutions reported refugees “running for 
their lives”431 in the “tide of human misery,”432 during “Rwanda’s greatest and 
final wave of refugees.”433 The metaphors used to associate the refugees with 
“movements of water,” which CBS did by describing the “tide” and “wave” of 
people, was not far from earlier descriptions of an inevitable and chaotic 
“bloodbath” or “civil war” because they all stereotypically suggest that it was a 
typical event that happens often.  
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In addition to the television broadcasters presenting metaphors and 
stereotypes that associated the Rwandans with animals or a “natural” and 
inevitable “instant catastrophe,” ABC, CBS and NBC continued to describe the 
genocide as “tribal warfare” or “civil war.” By suggesting that the death toll was 
“higher than anyone believed”434 at half a million people because of the “tribal 
warfare”435; or by explaining that “Rwanda's civil war continues down its bloody 
path” and that “there is no end in sight,” the broadcasters implied that the 
massacres and the refugee crisis was caused by “something innate within the 
Rwandan people who are likely to burst into savage slaughter at any time.”436 
However, as Franks suggests, all of the stories were not completely fueled by 
African stereotypes and “tired clichés” because “they are also wildly inaccurate.” 
To be fair, as I will highlight below, the television broadcasters did occasionally 
refer to the atrocities happening in Rwanda between May and July as “genocide,” 
but it was still done inconsistently and far too late. 
 
‘Genocide Amnesia’ and understanding ‘context’  
 The stories about the genocide and the resulting refugee crisis made their 
way through “various gatekeepers and various organizational routines”437 and 
were “constructed and shaped by reporters and editors who determine what is 
worthy of coverage and what is not and how events will be presented.”438 
Between May and July of 1994, ABC, CBS and NBC television news broadcasts 	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often referred to Rwanda with stereotypical “ethnic” or “tribal” labels suggesting 
that the conflict was “based on little more than brutal tribalism.”439 The journalists, 
like Mark Phillips, who were on the ground in Rwanda, started presenting stories 
towards the end of July—the first on July 15 with CBS—suggesting that the 
genocide in Rwanda was more than just a tribal massacre. However, despite 
presenting some truth and context, the American broadcasters often experienced 
a kind of ‘genocide amnesia,’440	  in which they identified genocide in one report 
and then reverted to the stereotypical myths of  “tribal warfare” or a “civil war” in a 
subsequent report.  
 For example, on May 7 and 9, ‘genocide amnesia’ was clearly at play 
when ABC acknowledged that it was in fact a “premeditated political act not a 
spontaneous ethnic hatred”441and human rights investigators “see a pattern,”442 
and CBS explained that the “bloodbath” in Rwanda would leave behind a “legacy 
of genocide.”443 However, on May 13, CBS returned to the myth of “nightmarish 
bloodbath in Rwanda,” and ABC followed suit on May 14, when they suggested 
that “at least half 1 million people have been killed during Rwanda's 5 weeks of 
civil war.” ABC’s ‘genocide amnesia’ seemed to only last until May 16 when they 
interviewed Jean Kambanda, the interim Rwandan Prime Minister, who said: “I 
don't think you'll find any proof of complicity by our government in the 
massacres.” However, the journalist, Ron Allen, seemed to refute that response 
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by suggesting that the government was not telling the truth because they were 
largely responsible for the genocide: “Hardly anyone who has investigated the 
massacres believes the Rwandan government’s version of what happened.”444 
‘Genocide amnesia’ affected all of the American television broadcasters until the 
end of the month when ABC suggested that, after 2 weeks of not using the word, 
“from Rwanda today, the latest evidence of the genocide,”445 which was narrated 
over an image of a pile of dead bodies under a bridge.  
NBC also experienced the side effects of “genocide amnesia” between a 
story that they presented on May 1—describing the situation in Rwanda as a 
“genocide”—and June 26, when they interviewed American National Security 
Adviser, Tony Lake, who suggested, “Rwanda should galvanize American 
concern for Africa” because it is “a story of ethnic hatred transformed into 
genocide.”446 The most telling part of NBC’s June 26 story was when Tom Petit 
juxtaposed the interview with the conference that was going to focus on “How 
America can lift pessimism into constructive plans for Rwandans and all of 
Africa.” For a media institution that promoted the transformation of “pessimism 
into constructive plans for Rwandans and all of Africa,” NBC disregarded their 
own advice because they only presented six very brief ten second stories 
throughout the month of June 1994. Only one of those—the one using Tony 
Lake’s quote—acknowledged the genocide and “constructive plans” for Rwanda.	  
 After June 26, July 4 was the next time any of the American television 
broadcasters reiterated that the events in Rwanda were in fact genocide. For 	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example on July 4, while NBC and CBS highlighted three months of “civil war,”447 
ABC moved away from its “genocide amnesia” thanks to Ron Allen who 
suggested, “these Tutsi children have survived Rwanda's genocide, but their 
scars are indelible, crippling and deep” and “everywhere there are stories of 
horrific ordeals.”448 Finally acknowledging that the Hutu government was indeed 
committing a well planned and premeditated genocide was certainly a big step 
for both CBS449 and the American government, but it happened only three days 
before the genocide was over. Instead of publicly acknowledging the genocide 
and the government's role in the crisis months prior, both the American 
government and the American television broadcasters turned a blind eye to the 
murder of close to one million people. In fact, if any particular television network 
should be embarrassed by the mythology that it reported, NBC certainly should—
especially considering that throughout the entire month of July 1994, the word 
genocide was never used on their network. 
 The broadcasts by ABC on July 16 and CBS on July 18 were the two most 
important broadcasts of the entire genocide. In these broadcasts, the networks 
had the story right, included the context, and the history of the conflict. However, 
it is extremely unfortunate to realize that these reports did not come until the final 
days and hours of the genocide. Like the previous stories, the July 18 piece on 
CBS began by exposing many of the typical myths associated with Rwanda and 
the “months of the war and tribal massacres.”450  However, like the story 
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presented on July 16, the importance of the July 18 broadcast once again relied 
on the words of CBS’ correspondent, Mark Phillips, and the way in which he 
finally outlined the truth behind the genocide. Unfortunately, CBS did not 
broadcast Philips’ brilliant epiphany until the very last day of the massacre, but it 
was still an important acknowledgment for CBS to realize that they somehow “did 
contribute to [the genocide].” I consider the July 18 broadcast on CBS a bold 
statement by the network, but it was, tragically, far too late. 
In a way, that point was also highlighted on ABC, on July 18, shortly after 
Peter Jennings said: “We begin tonight with Rwanda. Can it get any worse? Yes 
it can.” As one can see from the coverage, the beginning of the July 18 broadcast 
was rather stereotypical with the suggestion that everything happening in 
Rwanda was inevitably getting worse and they followed the story with John 
McWethy highlighting another one of the reasons why, similar to the CBS 
broadcast, the American government was not interested in intervention: “When 
the idea of sending US medical teams or water specialists to Rwanda is raised, 
the Clinton administration says no. The White House wants no repeat of the 
disaster in Somalia, so the US will fly supplies to the region, but get no more 
deeply involved.”451 As I outlined in Chapter II, fears about repeating the “disaster 
in Somalia” were often used as a comparative metaphor from the beginning of 
the television coverage of the genocide on April 6. However, on the very last day 
of the genocide, July 18, ABC concluded their story on Rwanda with an interview 
with Roger Winter—who was also often interviewed by the other networks—and 
he stressed that the genocide in Rwanda was definitely not “yet another African 	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bloodletting”: “This situation cannot be allowed to be viewed as yet another 
African bloodletting, but it was genocide in perhaps the purest construct of 
genocide that we've had since the Holocaust.”452  
 
Conclusion 
As one can see in the footage, the influence of “genocide amnesia” on the 
American television networks affected the way in which ABC, CBS and NBC 
described the genocide. However, not all of the blame can be put on the 
journalists, because it was the journalists on the ground in Rwanda—Philips and 
Allen—who understood the context of what was happening, told the truth and 
deconstructed previously reported myths. But by the time they had learned about 
the history and provided proper context at the end of July, close to one million 
people had already been killed. With those few exceptions, American television 
broadcasters were not focused on the genocide, and the stories from May until 
July constructed a different kind of stereotype that focused on the refugees and 
the humanitarian crisis “visible in US media only as crowded masses of ‘dirty,’ 
‘unhealthy,’ ‘fatigued,’ ‘diseased’ bodies and therefore are understood as the 
vulgar anti-thesis of Western norms.”453 Myths about the Rwandans – both 
genocide victims and perpetrators and the fleeing refugees – continued to 
circulate in the network coverage and reinforced a racist portrayal of Africa. 
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Conclusion 
Reflecting on the genocide in 2007, Allan Thompson suggested that “the 
stark reality is that all these years later, we have barely begun to learn the 
lessons about Rwanda.” 454 One of the lessons we need to acknowledge is the 
continuity between the racist discourse in colonial Rwanda and the Western 
news coverage of the postcolonial massacres.  We need to explore how the 
media – particularly the American news networks – “contributed directly to the 
genocide.”455 I have laboured under the premise that the mistakes of the past, 
those bungled stories about the Rwandan genocide in 1994, will influence the 
way future genocides are covered in the international news. Learning from the 
mistakes of the past can be useful because, as Allan Thompson points out, 
hindsight makes it “easy to see what the news media did wrong.”456 This point is 
reiterated by Linda Melvern, who suggests, “if the media forget the story then it is 
the media that has failed.”457 Likewise, Allan Thompson claims, “journalists could 
have had an impact in Rwanda—a sort of Heisenberg effect—had there been a 
significant enough media presence to influence events.”458 Unfortunately, instead 
of intervening, the American television media simply abandoned Rwanda after 
misinterpreting the genocide as ‘tribal warfare’ while hundreds of thousands of 
people were murdered. By the time the RPF took control of Kigali, and many of 
the international journalists were finally able to make their way safely into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 Thompson, “Introduction,” 11.  
455 Thompson, “Introduction,” 8. 
456 Melvern, “Missing the Story: The Media and the Rwanda Genocide,” 106. 
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Rwanda, it was the end of July and the genocide was over.459 Only then were the 
journalists able to see the aftermath of the systematic massacres with their own 
eyes, acknowledge the truth of the genocide and reconsider the accepted 
discourse of a supposedly random spontaneous ‘tribal slaughter’.  
My analysis dovetails with Fair’s assertion that it was entirely possible for 
“engaged reporters and active spectators” to “force televised video footage and 
aerial images to bear witness to events that our political leaders refuse to 
`see`.”460 However, while it is important to encourage political leaders to “bear 
witness,” it cannot happen unless individual viewers question the media 
messages they consume. Fair writes:  
Theories about gender, post-colonialism, race/ethnicity, and 
post- modernism in and of themselves do not provide the 
answers, but simply provide the tools to be critical; it is up to the 
viewer of images to deploy these tools to question and 
reconsider what is beamed into their televisions or printed in their 
morning paper.461 
For the sake of the victims of future humanitarian crises and future genocides, 
the international community must examine the mistakes we made in 1994. Even 
though the mediascape has changed since 1994 with the introduction of social 
networks and ‘citizen journalism’, Journalists still must be increasingly vigilant, 
corporate news must examine their story priorities, and the public must take 
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responsibility for the ways their viewership influences network coverage of stories 
about celebrities and stories about mass genocide. My goal in this thesis was not 
simply to reveal the flaws in the American television news networks, but also to 
suggest a potentially optimistic future where journalists could influence political 
and humanitarian intervention. The opportunity to make crimes against humanity 
‘visible’ exists today in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, and the Nuba 
Mountains in Southern Sudan, among others. If the international media and the 
American television broadcasters learn from the mistakes of the past, perhaps 
journalists will one day contribute to stopping a genocide instead of simply 
ignoring it.  
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